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ABSTRACT 
Corporate income tax is the largest source of revenue to Inland Revenue Board of 
Malaysia (IRBM). Hence, the increase of tax non-compliance among corporate 
taxpayers concerns IRBM and tax authorities globally as the government loses its 
major revenue which adversely affects the economy. Tax evasion oflarge corporations 
using accounting manipulations implies the potential role of corporate governance 
against tax non-compliance. Therefore, this study attempts to determine the impact of 
corporate governance characteristic to tax compliance among corporate taxpayers 
specifically the public listed companies in Malaysia. This study was conducted on 1 1 1  
tax audited cases of public listed company listed on the main market of Bursa Malaysia 
that had been finalised by IRBM for year of assessment 2013 and 2014. Data from 
their annual report were then used to determine the corporate governance characteristic 
of each public listed companies namely(!) board composition (2) independent director 
service tenure (3) separation of chairman and Chief Executive Officer (4) audit 
committee competency (5) non-audit service by external auditor and (6) sourcing 
internal audit function. Next, three models of tax compliance were developed 
specifically filing, reporting and payment compliance to better capture different 
compliance issues. Logistic regression results revealed that director service tenure has 
significant impact on tax compliance where public listed company with an independent 
director who have been in service for more than 9 years are more likely to be filing 
compliant. Whereas public listed company with an independent director who have 
been in service for less than 9 years are payment compliant. However, this study only 
sampled a small number of public listed companies. Therefore in order to generalize 
the findings due care should be exercised. This research findings contributes an added 
value to tax literature and tax authorities on the impact of corporate governance 
characteristic to specific type of tax compliance of public listed companies in 
Malaysia. 




Cukai pendapatan korporat adalah sumber utama pendapatan Lembaga Hasil Dalam 
Negeri Malaysia (LHDNM). Oleh itu, peningkatan ketidakpatuhan cukai di kalangan 
pembayar cukai korporat membimbangkan LHDNM dan pihak berkuasa cukai di 
seluruh dunia kerana kerajaan kehilangan hasil utama yang memberi kesan negatif 
kepada ekonomi. Pelarian cukai oleh syarikat besar menggunakan manipulasi 
perakaunan menjadi petunjuk kepada potensi peranan urus tadbir korporat terhadap 
ketidakpatuhan cukai. Kajian ini dibuat untuk menentukan kesan tadbir urus korporat 
kepada kepatuhan cukai di kalangan pembayar cukai korporat ke atas 1 1 1  kes syarikat 
awam disenaraikan di papan utama Bursa Malaysia yang telah diaudit oleh LHDNM 
bagi tahun taksiran 2013 dan 2014. Data laporan tahunan digunakan untuk menentukan 
ciri tadbir urus korporat iaitu (I) komposisi lembaga pengarah (2) tempoh 
perkhidmatan pengarah bebas (3) pemisahan kuasa pengerusi dan ketua pegawai 
eksekutif (4) kecekapan jawatankuasa audit (5) perkhidmatan bukan audit oleh 
juruaudit luaran dan (6) sumber fungsi audit dalaman. Kemudian tiga model 
kepatuhan cukai dibangunkan iaitu pemfailan, pelaporan dan pematuhan pembayaran 
untuk mendapatkan gambaran isu pematuhan dengan lebih baik. Keputusan regresi 
logistik menunjukkan bahawa tempoh perkhidmatan pengarah bebas mempunyai 
kesan terhadap kepatuhan pengarah bebas di mana syarikat awam yang mempunyai 
pengarah be bas yang berkhidmat melebihi 9 tahun lebih cenderung untuk patuh kepada 
program penfailan borang cukai. Manakala syarikat awam yang mempunyai pengarah 
bebas yang berkhidmat kurang daripada 9 tahun lebih cenderung untuk patuh kepada 
pembayaran cukai. Waiau bagaimanapun, kajian ini hanya merangkumi sebilangan 
kecil syarikat tersenarai awam dan tidak menggambarkan syarikat tersenarai awam 
secara keseluruhan. Oleh itu, penggunaan penemuan ini secara umum hendaklah 
secara berhati-hati. Penemuan penyelidikan ini menyumbang nilai tambah kepada 
kesusasteraan cukai dan pihak berkuasa cukai mengenai kesan ciri tadbir urus korporat 
kepada kategori tertentu pematuhan cukai oleh syarikat-syarikat tersenarai awam. 
Kata kunci: tadbir urus korporat; syarikat tersenarai awam; ketidakpatuhan cukai, 
pemfailan, pelaporan, pematuhan bayaran 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 


















Taxation is one of the most important government tool to influence the country's 
economic growth and affect the company's economic activity (Romer & Romer, 
2010). Both parties have conflicting interest where tax is a source of income for 
government while for companies, tax will reduce their net income (Mulyadi & Anwar, 
2014). Recent development shows that companies no longer consider compliance 
function as their tax obligation (Desai & Dharmapala, 2006). This is due to the fact 
that taxes involves a great proportion of the company's earnings which will eventually 
reduce their profits (Annuar, Salihu, & Sheikh Obid, 2014). Despite the fact that there 
are strict laws in almost every country, companies would employ accountant, tax 
experts or using other means available to avoid paying high taxes (Schofield, 2015). 
According to Gomes (2015), companies would report a huge income but finding 
opportunities by way ofreducing tax burden to increase the company value. 
A country's economy could be impaired due to extensive effect of poor corporate 
governance through capital market effect and tax revenue consequences (Mohd. Amin, 
Md. Noor, Mastuki, & Ambali, 2011) .  The increase trend of accounting scandals 
involving large companies have shown the possibility to evade taxes using tax shelters 
and manipulate the accounting earnings at the same time (Desai & Dharmapala, 2009). 
Gary & Edmund (2002) pointed out that in Enron company case reported by Joint 
Committee on Taxation (JCT) of the US Congress, the manager act opportunistically 
for individual benefits rather than for stakeholders through the use of tax shelters in 






















Despite of reporting US$159 billion book income, Enron did not make any payment 
of corporate tax in 1998 by using the tax benefits and loopholes to reduce the 
company's tax liability such as the creation of692 subsidiaries in Cayman Island. This 
trend has been a concern to the government as tax management can be used as a tool 
to increase the company's performance which adversely reduce the government 
income. Therefore, the public authorities are in continuous battle to combat tax non- 
compliance through legislative reforms. 
In order to understand the determinants of tax non-compliance on corporate taxpayers, 
several studies have been conducted worldwide. Previous studies by Desai, Dyck, & 
Zingales (2003), Tedds (2006), Sartori (2009), Mohd. Amin, Md. Noor, Mastuki, & 
Ambali (2011) suggested that there are significant impact of corporate governance on 
tax compliance. Corporate governance is a mechanism that control a company so it 
can run effectively in meeting both interest of external (government) and internal 
stakeholder (management) while taxes influence the company's financial decision 
making (Desai & Dharmapala, 2004). This implies that companies with good 
governance are more likely to have good internal control mechanism by producing 
high level of transparency and would indirectly prevent companies from conducting 
strategic tax avoidance or evasion (Desai & Dharmapala, 2007). Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Countries in the Final Seoul 
Declaration has also emphasized the importance of corporate governance in deterring 
tax non-compliance behaviours (Sartori, 2009). 
It is important to learn how corporate governance could mitigate the risks for tax non- 
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governance (Gomes, 2015). However, the quest to formulate the best corporate 
governance system that could increase tax compliance and prevent such scandal in 
future is an ongoing process (Desai, Dyck, & Zingales, 2003). 
In Malaysia, regulatory framework on corporate governance for public listed 
companies are governed by the regulator and statutory bodies through law, code and 
regulatory requirements. Thus, in order to address the relationship between corporate 
governance and tax compliance, this paper attempts to study selected public listed 
company that were listed in the main market1 of Bursa Malaysia with certain corporate 
governance characteristics and its corresponding level of tax compliance data that is 
filing, reporting and payment compliance. The tax compliance data were taken from 
Inland Revenue Board of Malaysia (IRBM) database which is not in public domain. 
The use of actual tax data would be beneficial as it will give clearer picture on type of 
corporate governance characteristic that have significant relationship with tax 
compliance so that policymakers would improve the existing techniques, rules and 
regulations using different aspect of corporate governance characteristic. 
1.1 Problem statements 
IRBM depends on corporate income tax (CIT) as the major source of revenue. In 2014, 
IRBM has collected RM6. 948 billion of CIT which contributed 52 percent of the 
IRBM's tax collection (IRBM, 2014). 
However based on the statistic in 2012 it was reported that there were 79,688 corporate 
tax audited cases were resolved resulting in an additional tax and penalty ofRMl,591 
1  Public listed company can be categorised into (I) main market (2) ACE market and (3) LEAP market. 
3 
_j 
million, 83,093 tax audit cases in 2013 with additional tax and penalty of RM3,023 
million whereas in 2014 it was reported that there were 98,615 corporate tax audited 
cases conducted and resolved, resulting in an additional tax and penalty ofRM3,219 
million (IRBM, 2014). The increase of cases and additional taxes and penalties 
discovered during tax audit shows the spreading of tax non-compliance activities and 
the total of corporate tax revenue loss in Malaysia which shown in Table 1-1 below. 
Table 1-1 
Corporate Tax Audit in Malaysia 
2014 2013 2012 
L 
L 
No. of audit cases 













Although it is normally accepted that tax non-compliance exist in every country (Oh 
& Lim, 2011 ), the increase of tax non-compliance among corporate tax payers has 
always been a problem to the tax authorities as it represent serious revenue losses to 
the government and positively correlated with the level of economic activities (OECD, 
2010). This has been documented in recent tax cases involving public listed companies 
in Malaysia such as MMC Corp Berhad which were served with notices of assessment 
of RM45.91 million, Aeon Credit Service (M) Berhad with RM96.82 million, 
Cocoaland Holdings Berhad with RM5.89 million, whereas Tenaga Nasional Berhad 
and Country Heights Holdings Berhad executive chairman have also been taken in 
recouping with unpaid taxes of of RM2.07 billion and RM22.5 million respectively 
(The Edge, 201 7). 















Malaysia have also experienced unfortunate collapses and losses of public listed 
companies due to lack of internal control such as Transmile Group Berhad, Omega 
Securities, Technology Resources Industris Berhad, Perwaja Steel Sdn Bhd and 
Malaysian Airlines System that involved in unauthorized payments, using several 
margin accounts to arrange off-market transactions and submitting false information 
to Bursa Malaysia (Mat Norwani, Mohamad, & Tamby Chek, 2011).  These scandals 
involving the public listed companies also shows that without internal control, the 
companies are in the position to decrease their taxable income as well as increase their 
accounting earnings (Kourdoumpalou & Karagiogos, 2012). This would also indicate 
that internal control especially coming from good corporate governance are important 
factors to prevent tax non-compliance. 
Several studies suggests the potential role of corporate governance in intervening tax 
non-compliance (Desai, Dyck, & Zingales, 2003; Desai & Dharmapala, Taxation and 
corporate governance: An Economic Approach, 2007; Annuar, Salihu, & Sheikh Obid, 
2014; Minnick & Noga, 2010; Boussaidi & Hamed, 2015). However this study is 
unique as it offers the opportunity to examine the tax compliance based on the actual 
tax data in terms of filing, reporting and payment compliance using different corporate 
governance characteristic. Six corporate governance characteristic were selected 
based on previous literature and recommendations in Malaysian Code on Corporate 
Governance (MCCG) that linked to the internal control issues of a company such as 
board composition, independent director service tenure, separation of chairman and 
Chief Executive Officer (CEO), audit committee competency, non-audit service by 




1.2 Research questions 
The following research questions are necessary to be addressed: 
(a) What is the relationship between the following corporate governance 













(iii) Separation of chairman and CEO 
(iv) Audit committee competency 
(v) Non-audit service by external auditor 
(vi) Sourcing internal audit function 
1.3 Research objectives 
The main objective is to examine the relationship between the following corporate 
governance characteristic and corporate tax compliance of public listed companies in 
Malaysia: 
(i) Board composition 







Separation of chairman and CEO 
Audit committee competency 
• I 
' ....,, 
(v) Non-audit service by external auditor 
(vi) Sourcing internal audit function 
1.4 Scope of the research 
The sample consist of public listed companies that had been audited from the year of 

















tax compliance, reporting compliance and payment compliance. From the tax audit 
data, this study then focuses on public listed companies that were listed in the main 
market of Bursa Malaysia. The data of corporate governance characteristics of each 
public listed companies were taken from annual reports that had been submitted to 
Bursa Malaysia for financial year 2013 and 2014. Six established corporate 
governance characteristics were examined in this study and will be used as 
independent variables based on established literature by Cohen, Krishnamoorthy, & 
Wright (2004) and principles in MCCG 2012 namely (1) board composition (2) 
independent director service tenure (3) separation of chairman and CEO ( 4) audit 
committee competency (5) non-audit service by external auditor and (6) sourcing 
internal audit function. 
The rationale for choosing two years of sample (2013 and 2014) is because corporate 
governance characteristics were selected based on the recommendations in MCCG 
2012 that were only fully implemented by public listed companies in financial year 
ended 2013 (Securities Commission Malaysia, 2012). The latest data from financial 
year ended 2014 is to ensure that IRBM has ample time to conduct tax audit on 
companies. On average, tax audit will only takes place two years after the fiscal year' 
which involves various process from the audit process and settlement of cases. In 
addition, payment of tax for any tax due could extend for another two years depending 
on the amount of tax settlement. 
The data were analysed in two stages using (I) descriptive analysis to portray the 
characteristics of a company by computing the mean, median, standard deviation, 










minimum, maximum and coefficient of variation and (2) logistic regression analysis 
to provide investigation on the effect of more than one independent variables to 
dependent variables simultaneously. 
1.5 Significance of the study 
This study may benefit and contribute both theoretically and practically m the 
following areas: 
1.5.1 Theoretical contributions 
As tax non-compliance is a predominant issue and is a common problem globally, this 
study would also benefit tax authorities and tax researchers worldwide. Even though 
various studies have been conducted worldwide to test the determinants of corporate 
governance on tax non-compliance (Desai, Dyck, & Zingales, 2003; Tedds, 2006: 
Sartori, 2009; Mohd. Amin, Md. Noor, Mastuki, & Ambali, 201 1 ) ,  the lack of 
literature in the area of corporate tax non-compliance based on the actual tax audit data 
in Malaysia had been pointed out by scholars. 
Other researchers only based on annual report that used the difference between 
Effective Tax Rate (ETR) and Statutory Tax Rate (STR) as proxy for corporate tax 
non-compliance (Desai, Dyck, & Zingales, 2003; Tedds, 2006: Sartori, 2009; Mohd. 
Amin, Md. Noor, Mastuki, & Ambali, 2011).  This method did not reflect the real 
situation of tax non-compliance or the occurrence of tax evasion as it could be due to 
tax rebate, tax incentive or legal tax planning. Therefore, this study will provide current 

















certain corporate governance characteristic based on the actual case of tax non- 
compliance . 
1.5.2 Practical contributions 
This study will help determine the performance of public listed companies in Malaysia 
in respect of the quality of the corporate governance characteristic to the following 
users: 
(a) Investors 
The results of this study will give information to investors on the level of public listed 
companies' governance and tax compliance in Malaysia in order to make good 
investment decisions. 
(b) Policymakers 
The study will provide insights and awareness of the current problems in dealing with 
accounting scandals involving public listed companies and the possibility to evade 
taxes in Malaysia which indirectly affects the economic. The policymaker may review 
the existing guidelines in MCCG 2012 in order to provide further guidance to public 
listed companies to avoid potentially damaging problems. 
(c) Tax administrator 
Corporate tax payers are the major contributor to IRBM in terms of tax collection. 
Any changes in the corporate sectors environment will give direct impact on total 
IRBM revenue collection especially under the Self-Assessment System. If the 

















corporate community resulting in increase of tax compliance, then this study could 
provide answers and insights for the IRBM to develop strategies to prevent, detect or 
predict corporate tax non-compliance in future. 
1.6 Organization of the thesis 
This study is organised into five chapters. Chapter one introduces the background of 
the research, focusing specifically on problem statement, research question, research 
objective, significance and the scope of the study. 
Chapter two review on the corporate tax compliance and corporate governance 
research and literature within Malaysia. This chapter explain the conceptual definition, 
theory relevant to the research and discover past studies on corporate governance and 
corporate tax compliance. 
Chapter three presents the research methodology with detail explanation on data 
collection technique and procedures. This chapter covers research design, population, 
and sample of the study, unit of analysis, sampling technique, data analysis technique 
and measurement of variables. The corporate governance characteristic that are 
proposed to affect tax compliance among public listed companies are discussed in 
detail. 
Chapter four presents the findings of the study comprehensively. Logistic regression 
is used to determine the relationship between variables, size, leverage and company's 















Chapter five starts with the discussion related to the findings of the study in detail. 
Then, this chapter compares the findings with the research objectives and questions 
and highlights the significant contributions of this study. Finally this chapter 
concludes the study, suggests direction for future research in this area and explains the 
contributions and limitations of the study. 
















CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES 
DEVELOPMENT 
2.0 Introduction 
This chapter covers literature review on taxation in Malaysia, corporate tax non- 
compliance and corporate governance. This study will also analyse the relationship 
between corporate governance characteristic and tax compliance. Previous researches 
were used as benchmark for this study to develop theoretical framework in order to 
answer the research objectives and research questions. 
2.1 Overview of taxation in Malaysia 
Tax revenue is a major contributor to Malaysia's federal government. About 80 
percent of the government's revenue in 2017 are from taxes which derived from 
indirect taxes' (26.9 percent) and direct taxes (53.1 percent) (Ministry of Finance 
Malaysia, 2018). IRBM is a statutory body under the Ministry of Finance5 that is 
responsible for collecting direct taxes. 
The main component in direct taxes are corporate, individuals, petroleum, withholding 
taxes, stamp duty and real property gains tax which were collected through the 
following laws (Singh, 2011)  :  
(a) Income Tax Act 1967 (ITA 1967) - Income tax in Malaysia on company, 
partnership, sole-proprietor, individual, co-operative, association and trust; 
4 The Royal Malaysian Customs Department is responsible for the enforcement of indirect taxes such 
as goods and services tax, import duties, export duties, sales tax, service tax, excise duty and sales tax. 






Petroleum (Income Tax) Act 1967 - Tax imposed on income from upstream 
petroleum operations6• The basis of taxation is very similar to the ITA 1967; 
Promotion of Investment Act 1986 - Tax incentives such as investment tax 
allowance, pioneer status, double deduction, infrastructure allowance and 
industrial adjustment allowance; 
·-' 
-' 
( d) Labuan Offshore Business Activity Act 1990 - Tax imposed on an offshore 
company that carrying out offshore business activity in or from Labuan 
L, 


















(f) The Stamp Act 1949 - Tax levied on written instruments especially on legal, 
financial and commercial instruments; 
The focus of this study is on corporate taxation which involves income tax on 
companies that is governed by IT A 1967 with the support of guidelines issued by 
IRBM to supplement and provide further explanation on the regulations. 
2.1.1 Corporate taxation in Malaysia 
Corporate taxation is the main component of direct tax which contributed more than 
50 percent of the Malaysia's total direct taxes collection in 2017 (Ministry of Finance 
Malaysia, 2018). Table 2-1 illustrates the composition of direct tax collection from 
2012 to 2017. The collection of corporate tax is expected to keep on increasing as the 
petroleum tax decreasing over the years due to fluctuation of oil price. 
6 Downstream petroleum activities (refining petroleum and developing petroleum products) are 















Composition of Direct Tax Revenue (RM million) 




Year Corporate tax lndivid ual tax 
tax 
RM % RM % RM % RM % 
2012 116,939 51,288 43.9 22,977 19.6 33,934 29.0 8,738 7.5 
2013 120,523 58,175 48.3 23,055 19. l 29,753 24.7 9,540 7.9 
2014 126,743 65,240 5 i.s 24,423 19.3 26,956 21.3 10, 124 8.0 
2015 1 1 1 ,770 63,679 57.0 26,321 23.5 11 ,559 I  0.3 l 0,211 9.1 
2016 109,608 63,625 58.0 27,566 25.1 8,422 7.7 9,995 9.1 
2017 119,699 67,822 56.7 30,089 25.1 10,937 9.1 I 0,851 9.1 
Source: 2016 & 2018 Economic Report (Ministry of Finance Malaysia) 
The main contributor of corporate income tax 7 are companies. Resident company8 in 
Malaysia are taxed on income accrued or derived from Malaysia. With effective from 
2004, income derived from outside Malaysia and remitted by a resident company is 
exempted from tax excluding industry such as banking, insurance, sea and air 
transport. Subsection 2(1) of the ITA 1967 defined a company as follows: 
"Company means a body corporate and includes any-body of persons 
established with separate legal identity by or under the laws of a territory outside 
Malaysia and a business trust" 
Corporate tax rate is one of mechanism used to generate the economic growth. Over 
the years the government of Malaysia have lowered the corporate tax rate to boost the 
economic development and to compete with other ASEAN countries in order to 
7 Corporate income tax shall be charged for a year of assessment on the chargeable income of a 
company, trust body, an executor of an estate of a deceased individual who domiciled outside Malaysia 
at the time of this death, a receiver with respect to 68(4) of the !TA 1967 applies and a limited liability 
partnership other than a limited liability (Paragrah 2, Schedule I of the !TA 1967) 
8 Resident company is determined by a company trading in Malaysia where business controls and 
management are exercised in Malaysia at any time during the year (Section 8 of the IT A 1967) 
14 
encourage investments locally or internationally. The summary of corporate tax rate 
for resident company is shown in Table 2-2 below. 
Table 2-2 
Corporate Tax Rates for Resident Companies 
Year Paid-up capital� RM2.5 million 
On first Subsequent 
RMS00,000 balance 
WITT W% 2� 
2008 20% 26% 
2009-2015 20% 25% 
2016 19% 24% 
2017 18% 24% 
Source : Schedule I of the IT A 1967 







Another mechanism used by the government of Malaysia to boost the economic 
growth is by offering various tax incentives to companies such as investment tax 
allowance, pioneer status, double deduction, infrastructure allowance and industrial 
adjustment allowance. These incentives are given to specific industries as a mechanism 
to promote economic activities and stimulate projects that have a high value impact 
and emerging technologies. 
In year 2001, IRBM has implemented the Self-Assessment System (SAS) that 
necessitates the companies to be accountable for their own tax affairs by estimating 
the tax payable, declaring and calculate chargeable sources of income, keeping 
documents and records and comply with other income tax laws and legislations (Isa, 
2014 ). Under SAS, tax compliance become more important as penalty will be imposed 
if taxpayer unable to do so. However according to Oh & Lim (2011) the problem of 
tax non-compliance is more apparent under this system. Therefore government 
requires a good tax system and effective tax administration to prevent tax non- 
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compliance as it can have a major impact on the effectiveness of tax policy and the 
trust of taxpayers with distributional justice. 
2.1.2 Corporate tax administration in Malaysia 
IRBM administer and monitor corporate taxation through the following tax 
administration (Singh, 2011) :  
(a) Ascertainment of tax liability - determined either by self-assessment' or 
officially by IRBM10 through various process which involves the determination 
of tax base, submission of tax returns and issuing the assessments or deemed 
assessment". 
(b) Collection of the tax - involves payment of taxes that can be made as and when 
the income is earned through instalment, at the time a tax return is filed or after 
an assessment is issued to the taxpayers. 
(c) Settlement of tax disputes and the imposition of penalties - The punishment 
range from the imposition of penalties to imprisonment. If taxpayer disagrees 
with the quantum of tax payable as per ( deemed) notice of assessment, a written 
notice of objection must be lodged to the IRBM within the stipulated time given. 
IRBM must then review the objection and when it cannot be resolved by two 
parties, the appeal would be referred to the Special Commissioner of Income 
Tax. Subsequent appeals can be made to the courts which act as the final 
interpreters and arbiters. 
• Self-assessment system is a process where the taxpayers have to compute their own tax liability and 
submit the tax returns based on the tax legislation and guidelines issued by the tax authorities. 
10 The IRBM has the authority to issue additional assessment if there are adjustments to the deemed 
assessment arising from tax audit 
u The filing ofa tax return date will constitute as deemed assessment. 
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In addition to the effort to ensure that the corporate tax were collected efficiently using 
tax administration, IRBM has also implemented various strategies to increase tax 
compliance in Malaysia. 
2.1.3 Strategies to taken by IRBM to increase tax compliance in Malaysia 
Strategies introduced by IRBM in order to combat tax non-compliance among 
taxpayers are as follows: 
(a) Tax audit 
Audit focus is one of the strategies in the Public Finance Reform (Pemandu, 2016) to 
combat tax non-compliance and to encourage voluntary compliance. Previous studies 
between audit probability and compliance showed a positive correlation where 
taxpayers may only comply with the tax laws when they have information on the 
possibilities of being audit (Mohdali, Isa, & Yusoff, 2014 ). In Malaysia, tax audit 
activities were executed under two categories, namely (1) Field audit activity is 
performed to detect any measures taken by taxpayer to reduce the tax liability and (2) 
Desk Audit review and raise additional assessment for taxpayers who fail to report 
incomes or make excessive claims based on the tax return and financial statements 
submitted by taxpayers (IRBM, 2012). 
(b) Transfer pricing audit 
Transfer pricing requires that the transaction of goods, services or intangibles price 
between related parties whether directly or indirectly must be deal at arm's length. The 
arm's length principle states that transfer prices of goods, services or intangibles with 
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the same or similar circumstances between related parties should be equivalent to 
prices with unrelated parties. 
( c) Tax investigation 
Investigation is part of the enforcement procedures undertaken by IRBM to prevent 
tax leakage and to increase voluntary tax compliance (IRBM, 2014). Tax investigation 
activities fall under two broad categories, namely ( 1) Civil Tax Investigations and (2) 
Criminal Tax Investigations. The main concern under civil tax investigations is to 
recover losses and to impose penalties, while criminal tax investigations would focus 
on gathering admissible evidence for prosecution under the ITA 1967 and other 
relevant legislation. 
IRBM recognised the needs to continue various enforcement activities to combat the 
hidden economy. IRBM is currently working with other government bodies including 
the police, Royal Customs Department, Securities Commissioner (SC) and the 
Companies Commission of Malaysia to combat tax evasion. 
( d) Collection of tax arrears 
In order to prevent the arrears in revenue, IRBM has the responsibility to ensure tax 
liabilities are collected efficiently by reducing the amount of arrears in current cases 
to a minimal level while at the same time avoiding the new arrears. 
(e) Collection of tax liability through instalment 
In order to make sure taxpayers settle the tax liability on time, provision of section 
I 07B/l 07C requires taxpayers to pay taxes by instalment through a notice twice a 
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month (Form CP204 for company, cooperative and trust body while Form CP500 for 
other than companies) issued by the Director General of IRBM on or before the 
deadline based on taxpayers period basis (IRBM, 2014). 
Although various strategies has been applied by IRBM, tax non-compliance is still a 
prevalent issue in Malaysia where companies are taking advantage of the tax loopholes 
in order to reduce its tax burden through excessive tax planning, tax evasion or tax 
avoidance. Despite the inter-governmental cooperation and exchange of information, 
most of the JRBM can only audit or investigate within their own territories. Therefore 
understanding reason for tax non-compliance is important to policy makers. 
2.2 Corporate tax non-compliance 
There a.re multiple concept, references and different ways to define tax non­ 
compliance, but most of them have the same meaning and purpose. A prevalent and 
simple view in previous research is tax non-compliance represent a way of reducing 
tax obligation (Desai & Dharmapala, 2006) to maximize their wealth due to the fact 
that it lead to cash savings, increased cash flow and offers the opportunities for further 
investments (Annuar, Salihu, & Sheikh Obid, 2014). According to Singh (2011) failure 
to comply with tax laws may occur due to inadvertence, neglect, misunderstanding or 
deliberately intent to evade. 
Tax non-compliance covers both unintentional non-compliance and intentional 
evasion of the taxpayer to meet the tax obligations (Alabede, Z. B. Z, & Idris, 2011) .  
Unintentional tax non-compliance may arise from complexity of the tax Jaws, taxpayer 
negligence, difficulty of keeping accurate records, inability to obtain information 
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whereas intentional tax non-compliance means payment of tax lesser than the law 
requires on actual taxable income. (Abdul, 200 I). 
Intentional tax non-compliance can be further divided into two types of activity; tax 
evasion and tax avoidance. Tax avoidance is the manipulation through reduction in tax 
liability legally and usually engaged by large corporations who have tax professionals 
advising on the interpretation of legal provisions (Abdul, 2001). Tax evasion is 
misreporting the nature of income or undertaking activities that is not consistent with 
the tax law in order to reduce the tax payable (Abdul, 200 l). Silvani (1994) categorise 
tax evasion into two part: (]) evasion with fraud such as forging or falsifying records 
and (2) evasion without fraud such as underreporting their taxes without falsifying or 
forging records. Both tax avoidance and evasion has negative impact as the expected 
revenue is not collected resulting in social and political distortions and undermines the 
fairness or "equity" of the tax system. 
2.2.1 Measurement of corporate tax compliance 
IT A 1967 does not have specific definition to describe corporate tax non-compliance 
in Malaysia. However, taxpayers who does not comply with the rules and regulations 
under IT A 1967 will be considered as non-compliant taxpayers and liable to penalties, 
fines and imprisonment depending on severity of offences. 
Kasipillai & Abdul Jabbar (2006) established that corporate tax non-compliance in 
Malaysia arises from: (]) Failure to submit tax returns (2) Under-reporting of taxable 
income (either through under-reporting of income or overstating deductions) (3) 
Failure to pay taxes; and ( 4) Failure to remit instalment payment on time. The study 
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by Brown & Mazur (2003) suggest that tax compliance into can be categories to (1) 
filing compliance which measure the percentage of required returns that are timely 
field (2) reporting compliance which measure the percentage of true tax liability that 
is correctly reported and (3) payment compliance which measure the percentage of 
reported tax is time! y paid. 
The outcome from previous studies as discussed above and the regulations under the 
IT A 1967 have found that tax non-compliance can be categorised into three distinct 
types namely filing non-compliance, reporting non-compliance and payment non- 
compliance which will provide a comprehensive definition of tax non-compliance. The 
relevant penalty based on section in IT A 1967 involved for each category of tax 
compliance are as follows: 
(a) Filing non-compliance 
Under the !TA 1967, every person who is chargeable to income tax is required to file 
a return of his income to IRBM. Filing non-compliance occurred when the taxpayer 
failed to furnish the return before the tax filing dateline which can be categorised into 
(1) non-submission of tax return (2) late submission of tax return. Type of penalties 
are shown in Table 2-3: 
Table 2-3 
Failure to Furnish Return or Notify Chargeability 
Offence Penalty 
Failure to furnish a return of income Subsection 112 ofITA 1967 
required under subsection 77(1) or • On conviction, a fine between 
77(1A), or given notice of chargeability RM200 and RM2,000 or 
in accordance with subsection 77(2) or imprisonment not exceeding six 




Table 2-3 (Continued) 
Offence 
Source: Malaysian IT A 1967 
(b) Reporting non-compliance 
Penalty 
• No prosecution, but taxpayer required 
to pay penalty of treble the amount of 
tax payable (subsection 112(3)) 
Under the SAS, the tax return is deemed to be an assessment. The IRBM is entitled to 
raise an additional assessment when there are adjustments to be made arising from tax 
audit in which penalty will be imposed as shown in Table 2-4. 
Table 2-4 
Incorrect Returns and Wilful Evasion 
Offence Penalty 
Submitting incorrect return of income or Subsection 113 oflTA 1967 
incorrect information on chargeability • If convicted, a fine between RMl,000 
and RMI 0,000 plus penalty of double 
the amount of tax undercharged 
(subsection 113(1)) ;  or 
• If no prosecution, taxpayer required 
to pay penalty equal to the amount of 
tax undercharged (subsection 113(2)) 
Wilfully and with intent to evade or Subsection 114 of ITA 1967 
assist any other person to evade tax • RMI ,000 to RM20,000/ 
imprisonment I both and 300% of tax 
undercharged (subsection 114(1)) 
Assist or advise (without reasonable Subsection 114 ofITA 1967 
care) others to under declare their • RM2,000 to RM20,000 I 
mcome. imprisonment I both (subsection 
114(1A)) 
Source: Malaysian IT A 1967 
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(c) Payment non-compliance 
Under SAS, the estimated tax liability of non-individual" needs to be determined 30 
days before the start of the basis period. Revision of the estimated tax liability can be 
made in the sixth month as well as the ninth month of the basis period. The twelve 
monthly instalments would be paid starting from the second month of the basis period. 
Penalties are imposed for failure to remit instalment on time as shown in Table 2-5. 
Table 2-5 
Failure to Remit Instalment on Time 
Type of taxpayer Penalty 
Other than company, trust body or co- Subsection 107B ofITA 1967 
operative society • Payment of instalments after 30 days 
from the date set - the amount unpaid 
shall be increased by 10% without 
any notice being served (paragraph 
107B(3)) 
• If the actual tax 3 0% higher than the 
revised estimate of tax - 10% 
increase on the difference between 
actual tax balances and estimated tax 
made (paragraph I 07B( 4 )) 
Company, trust body or co-operative Subsection 107C of ITA 1967 
society 
Source: Malaysian ITA 1967 
• Payment of instalments after the I 0th 
of the month following which is an 
instalment is due, the amount unpaid 
shall be increased by I 0% without 
any notice being served (Paragraph 
I 07C(9)) 
• If the actual tax 30% higher than the 
revised estimate of tax - I 0% 
increase on the difference between 
actual tax balances and estimated tax 
made (paragraph I 07C(I 0)) 
12 Non individual (i.e company, trust body and a co-operative society) 
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Any balance of tax payable is due for payment" irrespective of whether or not the 
taxpayer is objecting or appealing against the deemed assessment. If the tax payable 
remains outstanding, IRBM will institute civil proceedings for the recovery of tax due. 
Penalties are imposed for failure to settle the balance of tax payable as shown in Table 
2-6. 
Table 2-6 
Failure to Pay Taxes 
Offence 
Failure to pay taxes assessed 
Source: Malaysian ITA 1967 
Penalty 
Subsection 103 oflTA 1967 
• Any tax due and payable has not been 
paid by the due date : 
(a) 10% increase from the tax 
payable (subsection I 03(3)); 
(b) Additional 5% increment on the 
balance of (a) if the payment is 
not made after 60 days from the 
final date (subsection 103(4)). 
2.2.2 Corporate tax compliance among large companies 
Previous studies found that company size and tax non-compliance have negative 
relationship where tax evasion of small companies is generally higher than big 
companies (Hanlon, Mills, & Slemrod, 2005; Nur-Tegin, 2008; Tedds, 2010). Larger 
companies are more compliant than private limited companies as these companies are 
strictly controlled by laws. This discovery is not in line with study by Zimmerman 
(1983) stating the existence of political costs such as taxation would cause a company 
try to reduce profits by using various accounting methods. Large companies such as 
13 For company tax due is in the seventh month after the end of the basis period while for individual is 
on 30 April (employment income) and 30 June {business income) of the following year. 
24 
public listed companies will tends to not comply with tax due to their ability to manage 
income and with a wide range of accounting method as compared to small companies. 
This is consistent with a study by Hanlon, Mills, & Slemrod (2005) that shows larger 
companies have larger proposed audit deficiencies relative to 'true' tax liability. 
According to Contractor (2016) large companies' decision are made with the 
assessment of tax implication. The magnitude of tax non-compliance covers the global 
operations, location and supply chain where all the decisions are affected by tax 
considerations. Executives in large companies consider tax alongside with business 
strategy to minimize the tax liability such as global operations, supply chains and 
location decision. One of the current tax fraud case involving large company is Plutus 
Payroll. The head of the Australian Taxation Office (ATO) announced that the federal 
Australian federal government is missing out roughly $2.5 billion in tax revenue a year 
from Australia's biggest company, Plutus Payroll due to tax non-compliance and 
alleged abuse of public office (Hutchens, 2017). 
Recent tax cases concerning public listed companies in Malaysia such as MMC Corp 
Berhad, Aeon Credit Service (M) Berhad, Cocoaland Holdings Berhad and Country 
Heights Holdings Berhad have shown the significance and detrimental effect on the 
government revenue (The Edge, 2017). The study by (Otusanya, 2011)  shows that 
large companies using tax havens, offshore financial centres which shaped by 
globalisation to facilitate the anti-social tax practices for their own financial gain. 
Despite the fact that tax non-compliance create significant risks such as potential legal 
fees, penalty being imposed as mentioned above and repercussions for reputation, the 
issue of tax non-compliance has never been resolved (Schofield, 2015). For that 
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reason it is important for IRBM to understand the reasons for tax non-compliance in 
order to focus on the strategies to prevent tax leakage and to increase voluntary tax 
compliance. 
There are a number of extensive studies explaining the reason for tax non-compliance. 
Study by Contractor (2016) shows that one of the reason is the disconnection between 
the government's desire to collect revenues and the desire of companies to ensure 
shareholder interest by 'arranging' investments to minimise tax payment. Annuar, 
Salihu, & Sheikh Obid (2014) confirms that cash savings would lead to increase cash 
flow, the opportunities for investments and the ability to increase the company's value 
in terms of increased shares value and high dividends. According to Engida & Baisa 
(2014) the determinants of tax non-compliance behavior are due to (I) economic 
factors such as the perceptions of government spending and probability of tax audits, 
(2) institutional factors such as the efficiency of the tax authority or government (3) 
social factors such as fairness, changes of government policies, perceptions of equity 
and referred groups (family and friends) (4) individual factors such as lacking of tax 
knowledge especially on the offences and penalties and financial constraints, (5) 
demographics constraint and other variables such as education, gender, income and 
age. 
Based on previous studies as discussed above, one of the factors of tax non-compliance 
that can be improved is to reduce the ability of company to manipulate their earnings 
through tax reduction and to increase the efficiency of the tax authority or government. 
Therefore, this study suggested that the tax authority should focus on the corporate 
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governance which could reduce potential conflict by aligning the interest of the 
companies and tax authority or government. 
2.3 Corporate governance. 
Corporate governance have become important reforms worldwide. There are several 
definitions relating to corporate governance. The Cadbury Report (1992) Section 2.5 
defines corporate governance as the system by which companies are directed and 
controlled. The corporate governance explained on the rights and responsibilities of 
participants in the corporations, such as the role of board, the management, 
shareholders, the laws and regulation in making decisions on corporate affairs (The 
Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance , 1992). 
Due to the prevalence of financial reporting frauds and unprecedented number of 
earnings manipulation by the management, corporate governance has received 
increasing attention in practice and academic research (Cohen, Krishnamoorthy, & 
Wright, 2004). The improvement of corporate governance could reduce potential 
conflict by aligning the interest of external and internal stakeholder. It is a mechanism 
that control a corporation by creating a higher level of control and transparency 
(Mulyadi & Anwar, 2014) and ensures that corporation resources will only be spent in 
activities that bring the best return to the investors (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997; Porta, 
Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 2000). Corporate governance provides the structure to 
make sure that the company's objectives are set and strategies to achieve the objectives 
as well as performance monitoring process are determined (OECD, 2015). Companies 
that are well governed are able to raise the standard of the capital market and attract 




Sartori (2009) believed that the benefit of good principles corporate governance should 
be promoted by the policy makers. The Principles of Corporate Governance 2004 of 
OECD states that an effective legal and regulation backed by effective government 
agencies are necessary to ensure that corporate governance framework instilled by the 
corporation effectively in order to avoid the minority shareholders abuse (OECD, 
2004). 
2.3.1 Theory in Corporate Governance 
To better understand the corporate governance, this study will discuss several theories. 
Each theory discussed limited aspect of governance and cannot capture the whole 
theoretical basis of corporate governance (Clarke, 2004 ). The main theoretical 
framework for the majority of research on corporate governance revolves around 
agency theory, further developing to stakeholder theory that complement the agency 
theory by examining the wishes of shareholders and every party linked to the 
organisation. Whereas stewardship is an alternative to agency theory where managers 
are obligated to do a good job, maximize company profits and bring good returns to 
stockholders. (Borlea & Achim, 2013). 
(a) Agency Theory 
Agency theory was formulated to describe the issues raised from agency relationship . 
Jensen & Heckling (1976) define agency relationship as a contract where the owner 
(principals) hire managers (agents) as the decision makers of the company. 
Shareholder is the owner of the company while the managers act as an agent to perform 
service on behalf of the shareholder to maximise their return. Agency problems arise 
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when the agent act to protect their own personal interest (Jensen & Heckling, 1976). 
This may become a source of conflict that leads to a loss of shareholders' value where 
the managers tend to make decisions that are contradicting with the shareholders' 
interest (Dhaliwal, Huang, Moser, & Pereira, 2011)  
Corporate governance is used to alleviate the agency problems especially in large 
companies. Principals will enact governance mechanisms to monitor manager and to 
avoid behaviour that is not aligned with the interest of the principal (Madison, Holt, & 
Kellermanns, 2015). Denis (2001) suggest that two conditions must be followed for an 
effective governance (1) the governance mechanism must serve to narrow the gap 
between managers' and shareholders' interest and (2) the mechanism must have a 
significant impact on corporate performance. In return for meeting the conditions, 
performance of the company will be increase and the interest will be align (Fama, 
1980). 
(b) Stakeholder Theory 
Stakeholder theory by focuses on the relationship between company and a wider group 
of stakeholders. This theory was embedded in management in 1970 and gradually 
developed by Freeman (1984). Stakeholder is defined as any person/group that can be 
affected by the action of a company ( 1) internal stakeholders ( directors, employee) that 
involved in corporate governance process and (2) external stakeholders ( creditors, 
auditors, customers, suppliers, government agencies and community) (Freeman, 
1984). 
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This theory suggests that the managers should take into consideration the interest of 
each stakeholder in its governance process by mitigating the conflicts between each 
stakeholder. However when there is a conflict of interest, some stakeholder must be 
moderated or sacrificed in order to fulfil basic obligations to other stakeholders (Heath, 
2004 ). Corporate governance support the stakeholder theory where it refers to the 
process and structure used to direct and manage the company's business affairs with 
the objective of recognising long term shareholders value, while taking into account 
the interest of other stakeholder (Securities Commission Malaysia, 2007). 
(c) Stewardship Theory 
Stewardship theory describes the relationship between the principal and agent from a 
behavioural and governance perspective (Davis, Schoorman, & Donaldson, 1997). 
Under the stewardship theory, managers protect the interests of the shareholders and 
make decisions on their behalf based on altruism and the desire to serve the company 
and therefore align with the interest of the principle (Madison, Holt, & Kellermanns, 
2015). Company that apply stewardship place the CEO and Chairman under one 
executive with a board comprised mostly of in-house members. The option to apply 
stewardship governance allows more intimate knowledge of the company's operation 
and commitment to success. Single leader generates one channel of communication 
where the company communicates the needs to the shareholders and vice versa (Davis, 
Schoorman, & Donaldson, 1997). 
Agency and stewardship theories originate from two different principle. The basic 
agency problem revolves around individuals where they only consider themselves as 
individuals. However, stewardship theory suggest that individuals in management 
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positions do not consider themselves as isolated and often offers maximum autonomy 
built on trust (Donaldson & Davis, 1991 ). Because of different interpretation, theories 
and principle, management needs to determine governance strategy that best fits its 
company's identity, whether it be agency, stewardship or stakeholder or a hybrid of all 
three. 
2.3.2 Corporate Governance in Malaysia 
Malaysia committed in sustaining and promoting the good culture of corporate 
governance. Policy makers in Malaysia recognises the value of good governance and 
learnt valuable lessons from the 1997 and 1998 Asian Financial Crisis. They have 
focused on strategies to raise the corporate governance standards and strengthen the 
framework (Securities Commission Malaysia, 2012). 
The Finance Committee on Corporate Governance (FCCG) was established in l 999 
and made two recommendation (1) the MCCG and (2) the Minority Shareholders 
Watchdog Group (MSWG). In 2001 MCCG then became an integral part of Bursa 
Malaysia (Abdul Wahab, 2010). The objective for these recommendations is to create 
board that can perform its responsibilities effectively and protect the interest of 
shareholder (Zainal Abidin, Mustaffa Kamal, & Jusoff, 2009). 
Malaysia's corporate governance framework is instituted by the regulator and statutory 
bodies to strengthen the corporate governance framework. However the target group 
are public listed companies. A public listed company!" is a company that issues share 
14 Public listed company has to follow prescribed set of rules under the Securities Commission of 
Malaysia Equity Guidelines and Bursa Malaysia's Listing Requirements. Public listed company can be 
categorised into (1)  main market (2) ACE market and (3) LEAP market (Bursa Malaysia Berhad, 2017) 
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securities through initial public offering of shares (!PO) and traded on at least one 
stock exchange or in the over the counter market. A public listed company allows the 
market to determine the overall value of the company through daily trading (Bursa 
Malaysia, 2017). Even though the framework is focusing on public listed companies, 
non-listed entities are encouraged to implement this code on corporate governance to 
enhance their transparency, accountability and sustainability. 
The corporate governance framework for public listed companies are as follows: 
VOLUNTARY [ MANDATORY 
c:: ['-_HYB_RID_AP_P8'_0_A_CH_�]  
���������-'-��- 
] 
• Capital Market Services Act (2007) 
• Companies Act 1965 
• Bursa Malaysia - Listing Requirement 
• Malaysian Code on Corporate 
Governance 
Figure I 
Malaysia Corporate Governance Regulatory Framework 
The regulator and statutory bodies introduced several changes to incorporate corporate 
governance as follows (I)  The Capital Market Services Act (CMSA) which was 
enforced in 2007 to enhance the investor protection by introducing new provisions to 
widen SCs' power to act against directors who cause wrongful loss to their company 
and falsify the financial statement, (2) The Companies Act 1965 sets out the 
procedures for companies to be formed, operated, manage and how directors and 
shareholders can exercise their rights and powers. Significant changes can be seen to 
the corporate governance framework in Malaysia when the Companies (Amendment) 
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Act 2007 came into operation on 15 August 2007. The enactment creates amendments, 
substitutions and new provisions which wilJ have a significant impact principally on 
directors and lastly (3) Bursa Malaysia's Listing Requirements (LR) was developed to 
raise the standard of corporate governance and enhance the confidence of investor such 
as disclosure ofrecommendation under the principle set out in MCCG and provide the 
reasons for not foJJowing the recommendations (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2012). 
2.3.3 Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance 
MCCG was introduced to strengthen the corporate governance framework. In March 
2000, the first MCCG was issued, manifest the start of corporate governance reform 
in Malaysia. MCCG 2000 has contributed significantly in improving the corporate 
governance standards of Malaysian public listed companies. The Code was revised in 
2007. One of the changes are to strengthen the roles of the board of directors, internal 
audit function and audit committee. 
The launch of MCCG 2012 marked another significant milestone in corporate 
governance reform. MCCG 2012 underlines the principles of good governance, 
optimal corporate structures and internal processes. MCCG 2012 focuses on 
strengthening board structure and recognising the role of directors as active and 
responsible fiduciaries. In order to ensure the appropriate management of risks and 
internal controls, the additional duty of board is to ensure the company comply with 
laws, maintains an effective governance structure and ethical values. M CCG 2012 
advocates the adoption of standards beyond the minimum prescribed by regulation. 
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MCCG 2012 sets out principles and recommendations on structures and processes 
where companies able to apply in their business transactions and culture as explained 
in detailed in Table 2-7. 
Table 2-7 
MCCG 2012 Principles 






(i) Clearly set out the responsibilities of the board and 
management (1 . 1 )  
(ii) Board - Establish clear roles and responsibilities m 
discharging its fiduciary and leadership function (1.2) 
(iii) Formalize ethical standards through code of conduct and 
ensure compliance (1 .3) 
(iv) Ensure company's strategies promote sustainability (l.4) 
(v) Board should allow members access to information and 
advice (1.5) 
(vi) Supported by suitable, qualified and competent secretary 
(1 .6) 
(vii)Board- formalize, periodically review and make public its 
board charter (1.7) 
(i) Nominating committee (Non-executive directors/ Majority 
independent) (2.1) 
(ii) Criteria for recruitment process and annual assessment of 
directors (2.2) 
(iii) Formal and transparent remuneration policies & 
procedures and retain directors (2.3) 
Principles 
3. Reinforce (i) Assessment of independent director annually (3 . 1 )  
independence 
of independent (ii) Tenure of independent director less than 9 years (3 .2) 
directors 
(iii) Justify/get approval if more than 9 years (Chairman - Non 
exec member of the board) (3.3) 
(iv) Roles of Chairman and CEO- held by different individuals 
(3.4) 
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7. Recognize and 
manage risks 









(v) Majority independent directors if chairman non­ 
independent director (3.5) 
(i) Assessment of independent director annually (3.1) 
(ii) Tenure of independent director less than 9 years (3.2) 
(iii) Justify/get approval if more than 9 years (Chairman - Non 
exec member of the board) (3.3) 
(iv) Roles of Chairman and CEO-held by different individuals 
(3.4) 
(v) Majority independent directors if chairman non­ 
independent director (3.5) 
(i) Set the expectations on time commitment for members & 
protocol for accepting new directorships (4.1) 
(ii) Update knowledge and enhance skills of directors (4.2) 
(i) AC - Financial statement comply with financial reporting 
standard (5.1) 
(ii) AC - Policies and procedures to assess the sustainability 
and independence of external auditors (5.2) 
(i) Disclose the main feature of company's risk management 
framework and internal control system (6.1) 
(ii) Establish internal audit function - report directly to AC 
(6.2) 
(i) Corporate disclosure policies and procedures -compliance 
with Bursa Malaysia requirement (7.1) 
(ii) Leverage on IT in communicating with stakeholder 
(Establishing corporate governance in website - board 
charter, rights of shareholders and annual report) (7.2) 
(i) Encourage shareholder participation at GM (8.1) 
(ii) Electronic poll voting (8.2) 
(iii) Promote effective communication and proactive 
engagements with shareholder (8.3) 
Source: (Bursa Malaysia Berhad, 2013) 
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Further explanation on the corporate governance characteristic as stipulated in the 
principles and recommendation of MCCG 2012 which will be discussed based on 
previous literature in the next section. 
2.3.4 Corporate governance characteristic 
Corporate governance characteristic can be viewed from the combination of internal 
and external perspective (Zulkifli, Samad, & Ismail, 2006). The internal perspective 
refers to board of directors and equity ownership whereas corporate control market 
and legal or regulatory system are the external characteristic. 
This study will focus on the widely used corporate governance characteristic in 
academic research by Cohen, Krishnamoorthy, & Wright (2004) and 
recommendations in MCCG 2012 and the extent these recommendations are 
applicable and practical to corporate sector. 
(a) Board composition 
The standard view among governance experts is that board independence is necessary 
for an effective governance (Jouber & Fakhfakh, 201 I). Principle 3 of the MCCG 2012 
encourage board to have policies and procedures to reinforce independence and 
effectiveness of independent directors. Bursa Malaysia definition of an independent 
directors is "a director who is independent of management and free from any business 
or other relationship which could interfere with the exercise of independent judgement 
or the ability to act in the best interests of an applicant or a listed issuer" (Paragraph 
1 .0 I of the LR). 
36 
- 
Board composition refers to ratio of independent non-executive directors (INED) 
compared to the total number of directors on the board of a company (Zainal A bi din, 
Mustaffa Kamal, & Jusoff, 2009). MCCG 2012 recommendation under the principle 
of board independence is that when the chairman is not independent director, the board 
must comprise a majority of independent directors. SC requires all public listed 
company have at least two directors or one third of independent directors as its board 
(Paragraph 15.02(3) of the LR). Diversity is important to ensure different views and 
perspectives and more informed decision-making. Having independent director who 
are experts within the field would help to provide insights of trends and future forecasts 
for strategic planning (Bursa Malaysia Berhad, 2013).  
Study on board composition concern on issues related to the proportion of directors 
and the diversity of board members who bring value to the board deliberation (Cohen, 
Krishnamoorthy, & Wright, 2004) which in line with MCCG 2012. A study by Greco 
(2011) confirmed the agency theory-based which view that independent directors and 
insider ownership are substitute control mechanisms. Directors are more active in 
board that have higher proportion of independent representation and less active when 
directors-shareholders have direct access information and supervision. The presence 
of independent directors may constrain the opportunistic earnings management 
activity and ensure the management act responsibly and to the best interests of the 
stakeholders (Alves, 2011) .  
(b) Independent director service tenure 
Another MCCG 2012 recommendation is the tenure of an independent director of not 
exceeding cumulative term of nine years. An independent director may continue to 
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serve as a non-independent director after the completion of nine years of service. The 
reason would be long tenure can affect the independence of the director and the board 
need to keep their talent refreshed (Bursa Malaysia Berhad, 2013). Study by 
(Wiersema & Bantel, 1992) also found that longer tenure may result in declining 
performance due to the social cohesion between board member and the CEO. 
On the contrary, study by Peasnell, Pope & Young (2004) revealed that the tenure of 
non-executive is negatively associated with earnings management. Long tenure 
directors have greater expertise, experience, high commitment and reputation. If an 
independent director has longer tenure, the board is more effective in preventing 
earnings management. Their experience allows other directors gain better 
understanding of the company and its people to develop better governance. 
(c) Separation of Chairman and CEO 
MCCG 2012 recommendation under the principle of board independence is the 
positions of CEO and chairman should be held by different people and chairman must 
be a non-executive member (Bursa Malaysia Berhad, 2016). The debate as to whether 
the combination or the separation of CEO roles and the chairman of the board 
contribute to level of company's performance within the corporate governance 
framework, is based on the suggestion presented by agency theory and stewardship 
theory (Abdul Rahman & Mohd Haniffa, 2005). 
Agency theory proposed that CEO duality compromises the monitoring and control of 
the CEO, therefore it is bad for performance. Separation of role is important in order 
to ensure the balance of power between the two designations and to avoid conflict of 
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interest (Jensen & Fama, Separation of ownership and control, 1983). When the same 
person hold two powerful positions, it is more likely that person use his power to select 
directors of his favour. Shukeri, Ong & Shaari (2012) proved that CEO duality has a 
negative relationship with the company's performance. 
Stewardship theory in other hand, have different view where CEO duality is good due 
to the unity of command (Taktak & Mbarki, 2014). Combination of the two allow the 
CEO to have strategic vision and objectives with minimal board interference which 
will enhance the decision making process. Meanwhile Abdul Rahman & Mohamed 
Ali (2006), Hashim & S. (2008) and Elsayed (2007) found that in general CEO duality 
has no impact on company performance. However, the impact is found to vary across 
industries when the model include industry type and CEO duality. 
( d) Audit committee competency 
One of the principle under MCCG 2012 issued by the SC is that the board should make 
sure that stakeholder will able to rely on financial statements as a source of 
information. Financial expertise of audit committee is very important in order to 
enhance the financial reporting quality. MCCG 2012 recommends that audit 
committees should comprise of members with financial expertise who ensures that the 
financial statements of a company is reliable. One of the audit committee member must 
fulfil the financial expertise requirement under the LR (Bursa Malaysia Berhad, 2013). 
According to the agency theory, the financial expertise of audit committee enhances 
earnings quality (Al-Rassas & Kamardin, 2015). Xie, Davidson & Dadalt (2003) and 
Baxter & Cotter (2008) found that audit committees financial expertise decreases 
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earnings management. Alzeban (2015) research on Influence of Audit Committee 
Industry Expertise on Internal Audit, revealed that the quality of internal audit is 
enhanced when there is audit committee member that have industry and audit 
expertise. With regards to Malaysian companies, Md Yusof (2010) found that there is 
evidence that audit committee with financial expertise would lead to high earnings 
quality. 
(e) Non audit service by external auditor 
External auditors play a vital role to form an opinion and identify the financial risk that 
may result in financial statements adjustment and report to the shareholders at general 
meetings (Bursa Malaysia Berhad, 2013). MCCG 2012 recommends that the Audit 
Committee should review and monitor the independence and sustainability of external 
auditors. 
Policies that govern the non-audit services with the listing of services that are 
prohibited should be establish unless safeguards are in place. Ideally, non-audit 
services should not be performed when it is specifically prohibited by regulatory 
bodies and the charges are minimal as compared to the audit fees. The provision of 
non-audit services can impair the independence of external auditors (Bursa Malaysia 
Securites Berhad, 2013). Frankel, Johnson & Nelson (2002) found that non-audit 
service fees is associated with higher earnings management. However Dechow, Ge & 
Schrand (2010) show that investment in non-audit services should increase the 
auditor's capability to detect earnings management. Antle, Gordon, Narayanamoorthy 
& Zhou (2006) also found evidence that the level of abnormal accrual will decrease 
with non-audit services fees. 
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(f) Sourcing internal audit function 
An important element of corporate governance is to ensure good internal control 
system embedded in a company that mitigates organisational risk and to achieve 
corporate objectives. Internal audit played a significant role in the implementation of 
corporate governance when assessing the management's control practices 
effectiveness (Hermanson & Rittenberg, 2003). 
MCCG 2012 supports the roles of internal audit function as an independent board of 
audit committee. The role of internal audit function has been enforced by Paragraph 
15.27 of the Listing Requirements where a listed issuer must establish an independent 
internal audit function that reports directly to the audit committee and disclose whether 
the internal audit function is (I) in-house or (2) outsourced where internal audit 
services by independent accounting or audit firms (Carcello, Hermanson, & 
Raghunandan, 2005). Investment in the internal audit function enable the company to 
establish stronger controls over financial reporting and at the same time reducing the 
control problems (Lin, Pizzini, Vargus, & Bardhan, 2011 ). 
Maintaining internal audit requires investment in developing internal audit personnel 
professionally by recruiting, training with the latest methodology and technology. 
These significant amount of investment have forced companies to consider alternative 
due to economic pressure which is outsourcing. These changes have caused concern 
to stakeholder on the potential lack of internal auditors' independence and objectivity. 
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A study by Vecchio & Clinton (2003) have shown that in-house internal audit function 
has greater protection of proprietary information, internal monitoring and audit 
operations control to avoid associated risks from outsiders However James (2003) 
have different findings where in-house internal auditor are less independent and it is 
hard for an employee to be independent from the management. Results from a study 
by Al-Rassas & Kamardin (2015) suggest that outsourcing internal audit function 
relate to lower earnings management. 
2.4 Corporate governance and tax compliance 
There has been huge set of studies analysing the vanous effects that corporate 
governance has on a company as discussed earlier. However, previous study on the 
relationship between corporate governance and taxes are not as wide (Mohd. Amin, 
Md. Noor, Mastuki, & Ambali, 2011  ). This is due to the history of separation between 
the study of taxation and corporate governance (Desai & Dharmapala, Taxation and 
corporate governance: An Economic Approach, 2007). Corporate finance study have 
not incorporated the possibility of agency problems in their analyses and treated taxes 
only as market imperfections that influence the dividend policies and capital structure 
(Desai & Dharmapala, Taxation and corporate governance: An Economic Approach, 
2007). 
This study will discuss the findings from previous literature on relationship between 
corporate governance and tax compliance globally and in Malaysia as follows: 
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(a) Internationally 
The relationship between corporate governance and taxation have received attention 
in recent years due to current global financial crisis that involves tax avoidance and 
tax evasion (Desai & Dharmapala, Taxation and corporate governance: An Economic 
Approach, 2007). Countries are introducing legislation and standards that require large 
business to cooperate by providing greater transparency in their financial reporting 
such as analysis of tax positions. Investors suggesting that the shareholders and boards 
should consider procedures to review and supervise tax activities within firms (Desai 
& Dharmapala, 2006). Many large corporation have changed their corporate 
governance approach, tax compliance and business ethics (OECD, 2009). 
These development have called for researchers to examine the link of tax non­ 
compliance in an agency context hoping to generate insights into the tax policies and 
corporate governance effects. Schofield (2015) suggest that corporate governance and 
taxes combined are more effective. According to Sartori (2009), structures of corporate 
governance will determine how a company meet its tax obligations. A good corporate 
governance company will provide transparency and this would indirectly prevent 
managers from planning tax strategic behaviours (Desai & Dharmapala, Taxation and 
corporate governance: An Economic Approach, 2007). 
Desai & Dharmapala (2007) study shows that incorporating agency problems into the 
corporate tax avoidance analysis will leads to a different conclusion theoretically and 
empirically. Agency theory may be used to consider what motivates the agent to act 
and by understanding the mechanisms that create the tax avoidance in order to help 
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the companies to develop an improved corporate policy. Corporate governance can be 
used to redirect the behaviour of the agent and to realign with the principal's interests. 
However according to Boussaidi & Hamed (2015), agency theory does not provide 
detailed explanation on the relationship between corporate governance and tax non­ 
compliance. Agency theory only focus on the link between managers and shareholders 
which can affect the level of tax aggressiveness. Another theory suggested by 
Boussaidi & Hamed (2015) is the stakeholder theory that focuses on the relationship 
between firm and the stakeholders. Desai, Dyck & Zingales (2003) support the theory 
and suggest that corporate governance and taxation can be seen as three parties which 
are the state, insiders (managers) and outside shareholder (stakeholder). The state (tax 
administration) who enforces the influences of tax on the relationship between 
managers and stakeholder, while the relationship between managers and stakeholders 
(agency conflict) influences the corporate taxation system. 
The corporate governance view of taxation can be tested in various settings such as 
the tax system characteristic, type of tax avoidance and the environment of corporate 
governance (Desai & Dharmapala, Taxation and corporate governance: An Economic 
Approach, 2007). According to Desai, Dyck & Zingales (2003), corporate governances 
system plays an important part to determine the tax revenue sensitivity to changes in 
tax enforcement and structure of tax rates. Desai, Dyck & Zingales (2004) found that 
to assess corporate tax reform, policy maker should look into the pre-existing corporate 
governance situation. Countries with good governance able to use aggressive taxes to 
continuously improve corporate governance, meanwhile poor governance countries 
should avoid using taxes to improve corporate governance, as this might have a reverse 
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impact. When it is difficult to divert the income due to strong corporate governance, 
tax rates and tax revenues have more direct relation which is called the Laffer-curve 
effect. On the other hand, poorly-governed firms are more likely to reduce tax 
payments and subsequently getting the economic benefits personally (Bebchuk & 
Fried, 2004). It is fairly easy to divert the income in an ineffective corporate 
governance, where the manager will shelter the income to avoid taxation which will 
lead to reduction of reported income. 
Minnick & Noga (2010) note that tax management can be a complex" and it gives 
opportunity for the managers to pursue their own interest that may have benefits for 
short or long term. In their conclusion, governance plays an important part in tax 
management where tax management strategies are determined based on the 
companies' governance structures. Desai, Dyck & Zingales (2003) study found that 
good corporate governance enable the company with high level of ownership to 
enhance tax compliance as they gain more benefit compared to tax sheltering. This 
finding also was supported by Sartori (2009) where he found that corporate governance 
has positive impact on corporate tax compliance. In order to increase the manager's 
compliance with the tax system (without tax planning strategies to minimize 
company's tax obligation), policy maker should focus on good corporate governance 
principles to align the interests with higher level of transparency. 
Recent development shows that CEO and board of large companies are incorporating 
tax risk management as one of the company's corporate governance. Several tax 
administrations such as Australia, Canada and Chile have developed initiatives that 
15 Example, to be an effective tax management, the company may invest in tax haven where they do 
not require accounting information or adopt complex corporate structures. 
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support and encourage large businesses to consider corporate governance and 
enbanced the relationships that support tax risk management (OECD, 2009). Based on 
the experience in these three countries, large companies have corporate governance 
that are good and more transparent where tax administrations can expect fewer audit 
interventions resulting in greater certainty. 
(b) Malaysia 
Currently there is very minimal study available on the interaction between corporate 
governance and taxation in Malaysia. A study by Mohd. Amin, Md. Noor, Mastuki, 
& Ambali (2011) has found an empirical evidence that audit committee competency 
and board size has significant positive impact on tax compliance. The study also 
supported that there are significant differences on the level of corporate tax compliance 
among Malaysian public listed companies before and after the revision of MCCG in 
2007. 
Nik Ab Rahman (2011) study on public listed company from year 2000 to 2009 using 
ETR showed that corporate governance characteristic i.e board size and institutional 
investor are negatively related to tax non-compliance. These findings is supported by 
Mulyadi & Anwar (2014) where they further confirmed that there is significant impact 
of corporate governance to earnings management and tax management. The study 
suggest that when the company use earnings management practice to control its 
income, this will have an impact on the tax at the same time. In addition, a study by 
(Muhamed, 2014) showed that certain corporate governance characteristic do have 
positive relationship with tax compliance such as chairman independence and 
separation of power between CEO and chairman. 
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The relationship between corporate governance and tax compliance will be discussed 
further by focusing on the specific characteristic of corporate governance that have 
relationship with tax compliance. 
2.5 Corporate governance characteristic and tax compliance 
Over the past years, studies that examine the relationship between tax and corporate 
governance have increase such as board size, board of director composition, company 
size, ownership structure, corporate governance and tax environment changes, equity 
risk incentives and tax planning activities and the role of executives to determine the 
level of tax evasion or avoidance (Desai & Dharmapala, 2006; Lanis and Richardson, 
201 1  and Chen et al, 2010). Research by Desai & Dhannapala (2009) shows that the 
tax avoidance actions can be linked with diversionary activities such as earnings 
manipulation. Therefore the previous study on the relationship between corporate 
governance and earnings management can also be indirectly linked to tax non­ 
compliance. 
For the purpose of this study, the relationship between corporate governance 
characteristic and tax compliance in this study will be examined as follows: 
2.5.1 Board composition and tax compliance 
Taxation is one of the crucial decisions that has to be made by the board of director, 
whether to pay tax that will reduce the company's profit or to avoid paying tax which 
will increase the profit but getting the risk of being penalised by the tax authority in 
the future (Khaoula & Mohamed Ali, 2012). However not much attention had been 
paid to understand how board composition would influence the corporate tax planning 
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of a company. The board composition is important as it ensures that board attend to 
the common interest of all stakeholder and has the responsibility to fulfil the tax 
obligations of the company as they involved directly in corporate tax planning strategy 
(Erle, 2008). Study by Minnick & Noga (2010) found that independent directors has 
the power to reinforce tax planning as they are able to provide useful knowledge due 
to their experience. 
Study on board composition relationship with tax compliance shows that higher 
proportion of independent members on the board reduces the likelihood of tax 
avoidance or aggressiveness (Lanis & Richardson, 20 1 1  ). Independent directors 
should recognise that there are potential costs associated with extreme tax positions 
and, consequently, should attempt to mitigate extreme tax avoidance (Armstrong, 
Blouin, Jagolinzer, & Larcker, 2015). Yeung (2010) suggest that increase in board 
independency will decrease the tax aggressiveness which indicates that the company 
follows the government tax policy under good corporate governance. Beasly (1996) 
shows that the inclusion of a high proportion of independent directors prevent 
fraudulent action and the study also found that the percentage of outside directors on 
board in fraud-company is lower compared to non-fraudulent company in United 
States of American context. 
Based on these findings from previous literature and the recommendation from MCCG 
2012, it is expected that higher proportion of non-executive directors will deter the 




H1 : There is a positive relationship between board composition (higher proportion 
of non-executive directors) and tax compliance. 
2.5.2 Independent director service tenure and tax compliance 
As discussed previously, study by Wiersema & Bantel (1992) found that the outcome 
of longer tenure is declining performance due to the social cohesion between board 
member and the CEO and this will result in earnings management. However in 
contrast, the study by Peasnell, Pope & Young (2004) revealed that the tenure of non­ 
executive is negatively associated with earnings management. The board is more 
effective in preventing earnings management when the independent director has longer 
service. There are no empirical studies on tenure of independent director in relation to 
non-compliance has been found. Nevertheless the research by Desai & Dharmapala 
(2009) shows that the tax avoidance actions can be linked with diversionary activities 
such as earnings manipulation. Therefore the previous study on the relationship 
between the service tenure of independent director and earnings management can also 
be indirectly linked to tax non-compliance. 
Because of the conflict between MCCG principles and the empirical evidence on the 
issue of governance and earnings management, this study proposed no directional 
expectations between tenure of independent directors and tax compliance: 
H2: There is a relationship between independent director service tenure and tax 
compliance. 
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2.5.3 Separation of Chairman and CEO and tax compliance 
Previous literature suggest that weak governance of a company occurs when one 
person holding the CEO position that is responsible in running the business and at the 
same time act as the chairperson of the board that is responsible for monitoring and 
evaluating managerial action (Lam & Lee, 2008). Empirical studies in relation to tax 
compliance shows that CEO duality influences the likelihood of tax planning and 
reducing the effective tax rates activities (Khaoula & Mohamed Ali, 2012) as duality 
positions are able to create concentrated power which leads to the decision that gives 
personal best interest. Minnick & Noga (2010) suggest that companies with duality in 
CEO position have higher tax expenses and less tax management. 
Based on these findings from previous literature and the recommendation from MCCG 
2012, it is expected that separation of chairman and CEO will deter the likelihood of 
tax non-compliance. As such, this study proposed the following hypothesis: 
H1 : There is a positive relationship between separation of cit airman and CEO and 
tax compliance. 
2.5.4 Audit Committee competency and tax compliance 
As discussed previously, conferring to the agency theory, it is found that audit 
committee competency enhances earnings quality and decreases earnings management 
(Al-Rassas & Kamardin, 2015; Xie, Davidson & Dadalt, 2003; and Baxter & Cotter, 
2008). With regards to Malaysian companies, Md Yusof, (2010) found that there is 
evidence that audit committee with financial expertise would lead to high earnings 
quality. According to a study by Mohd. Amin, Md. Noor, Mastuki, & Ambali (2011), 





function. From the analysis it is found that audit committee competency has 
significant impact on corporate tax compliance. The empirical study have shown that 
corporate tax non-compliance is lower if the Audit Committee Chairman has an 
auditing or accounting background either education of practical experience. 
Based on these findings from previous literature and the recommendation from MCCG 
2012, it is expected that audit committee financial expertise will deter the likelihood 
of tax non-compliance. As such, this study proposed the following hypothesis: 
H,: There is a positive rekuionship between AC competency and tax compliance 
2.5.5 Non audit service by external auditor and tax compliance 
External auditor is an important mechanism to ensure that the financial statement is 
true and fair view of the actual activities of a company (Haron, 2009). Therefore non­ 
audit services should not be performed as it can impair the independence of external 
auditors (Bursa Malaysia Securites Berhad, 2013). Empirical studies in relation to tax 
compliance have shown that a company will less likely to be tax aggressive if they 
appoint auditor that have a low proportion of non-audit services (Richardson, Taylor, 
& Lan is, 2013). Lisowsky, Robinson, & Schimdt (2010) disagreed and suggest that 
external auditor view their clients as important and this lead to a strong independence 
effect which does not enable the company to render tax shelter activity. The reason 
for providing non-audit service is that the external auditor may have detailed 
knowledge of their clients' business operation, corporate structure and financial and 




Because of the conflict between MCCG principles and the empirical evidence on the 
issue of governance, this study proposed no directional expectations between the 
external auditor non-audit services and tax compliance as follows: 
Hs: There is a relationship between non-audit service by external auditor and tax 
compliance 
2.5.6 Sourcing Internal Audit Function and tax compliance 
As discussed previously, it is shown that in-house internal audit function has greater 
protection of proprietary information, internal monitoring and audit operations control 
to avoid associated risks from outsiders (Vecchio & Clinton, 2003). This view is 
supported by Al-Rassas & Kamardin (2015) where outsourcing internal audit function 
relate to lower earnings management. However another study have different findings 
where in-house internal auditor are less independent and it is hard for an employee to 
be independent from the management (James, 2003). 
Although there are no empirical studies on internal audit function in relation to tax 
compliance has been found, the research by Desai & Dharmapala (2009) shows that 
the tax avoidance actions can be combined and seen with diversified activities such as 
earnings manipulation. Therefore the previous study on the relationship between 
internal audit function and earnings management can be indirectly linked to tax non­ 
compliance. 
Because of the conflict between MCCG principles and the empirical evidence on the 
issue of governance, this study no directional expectations between the internal audit 
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function independence and tax compliance. As such, this study proposed the following 
hypothesis: 
H6 : There is a relationship between sourcing the internal audit f1111ctio11 and tax 
compliance 
2.6 Summary of hypotheses 
The hypotheses developed based on the literature review above are summarized and 
listed out at Table 2-8 below: 
Table 2-8 
Summary of Hypotheses 
Hypothesis 
Hs 
There is a positive relationship between board composition (higher 
proportion of independent director) and tax compliance 
There is a non-directional relationship between independent director 
service tenure and tax compliance 
There is a positive relationship between separation of chairman and CEO 
and tax compliance 
There is a positive relationship between audit committee competency and 
tax compliance 
There is a non-directional relationship between non-audit service by 
external auditor and tax compliance 
There is a non-directional relationship between sourcing internal audit 
function and tax compliance 
.- 
2.7 Summary 
This chapter discusses the relationship between corporate governance characteristic 
and tax compliance supported by previous researchers' empirical result. It also 
highlight the relationship between every independent variable and dependent variable 
that stated in the review of the literature. The relevant theories was outlined in this 
chapter and thereafter is concluded by providing the expected sign between both 
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dependent and independent variable in term of hypothesis. The methodology will be 
conducted and discussed in next chapter. 
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CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
3.0 Introduction 
This chapter will explain the methodology used in the study which includes research 
framework, hypotheses development, research design, measurements of variables, 
data collection procedures, research population, sampling technique and techniques of 
data analysis. 
3.1 Research framework 
This study develops new models to examine the relationship of corporate governance 
and tax compliance on public listed company based on previous literatures (Brown & 
Mazur, 2003; Mohd. Amin, Md. Noor, Mastuki, & Ambali, 2011).  Three models 
involved in this study which are filing compliance, reporting compliance and payment 
compliance as presented in Figure 2. 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE MECHANISM 
BOARD COMPOSITION 
INDEPENDENT DIRECTOR SERVICE TENURE 
� 
TAX 
SEPARATION OF CHAIRMAN AND CEO 
COMPLIANCE 
AUDIT COMMITTEE COMPETENCY 
b2 
FILING 
NON-AUDIT SERVICE BY EXTERNAL AUDITOR REPORTING 
PAYMENT 









3.2 Research design 
This study applies commonly used research design which is quantitative methodology 
using secondary data which is tax data from IRBM and annual report of the public 
listed companies. This method is concurred with previous studies to potray the level 
of tax compliance among public listed companies (Rice, 1992; Hanlon, Mills, & 
Slemrod, 2007; Mohd Yusof, Lai, & Yap, 2014). The method of analysis for this 
study are (I) descriptive research using annual report and tax data to portray the 
characteristics of a company and (2) logistic regression analysis to know the impact of 
a specific relationship. The reason for using these type of analyses are discussed in 
techniques of data analysis in paragraph 3.6. 
3.3 Measurement of variables 
This section discusses on the measurement of the dependent and independent 
variables. 
3.3.1 Measurement of dependent variables 
Based on the study by Brown & Mazur (2003) and Kasipillai & Abdul Jabbar (2006), 
this study grouped tax compliance into three models: 
(a) Filing compliance model 
Filing compliance is measured based on the company that has been imposed with 
penalties under section 1 1 2  of the ITA 1967 for not submitting the required return 
forms for the year 2013 and 2014 to IRBM in the prescribed period. For the purpose 
of this study, the filing compliance is measured and coded as "O" ifthere are penalties 
under section 1 1 2  of the ITA 1967 (non-compliance) and "I" if there is no penalty 
under section 1 1 2  of the IT A 1967 (compliance). 
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(b) Reporting compliance model 
Reporting compliance is measured based on the company that had been imposed with 
penalties under section 1 1 3  of the IT A 1967 for submitting incorrect return of income 
or incorrect information on chargeability for the year 2013 and 2014. For the purpose 
of this study, the reporting compliance is measured and coded as "O" if there are 
penalties under section 1 1 3  of the ITA 1967 (non-compliance) and "l" if there is no 
penalty under section 1 1 3  of the ITA 1967 (compliance). 
(c) Payment compliance model 
Payment compliance is measured based on the company that has been fined under 
section 103 for failure to pay taxes assessed for the year 2013 and 2014 or fined under 
subsection 107C of the IT A 1967 for failure to remit instalment on time or the actual 
tax 30% higher than the revised estimate of tax. For the purpose of this study, the 
reporting compliance is measured and coded as "O" if there are penalties under section 
103, 107C(9) or 107C(IO) of the !TA 1967 (non-compliance) and "I" if there is no 
penalty under section 103, 107C(9) or 107C(l 0) of the IT A 1967 (compliance). 
3.3.2 Measurement of Independent Variables 
Corporate governance characteristics are measured individually m this study as 
follows: 
(a) Board composition 
SC requires all public listed companies to have at least two directors or one third of its 
board are independent directors (whichever is the higher) (Paragraph 15.02(3) of the 
Listing Requirement). For the purpose of this study, board composition are measured 
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based on the ratio of INED to the total number of directors in the board in this manner 
(1) less than 34 percent (2) 34 to 67 percent (3) more than 67 percent. 
(b) Independent director service tenure 
Under the principle of board independence MCCG 2012, independent director tenure 
should not be more than a cumulative term of nine years. For the purpose of this study, 
the tenure of independent director is measured and coded as "O" if the tenure is more 
than nine years cumulatively (not complied with MCCG 2012) and "1" if the tenure is 
less than nine years and below (complied with MCCG 2012). 
(c) Separation of chairman and CEO 
Under the principle of board independence MCCG 2012, the Chairman of the board 
and CEO or Managing Director position held by separate individual to avoid conflict 
of interest and reduce the opportunity for self- interest decision. For the purpose of 
this study, duality is measured and coded as "O" (not complied with MCCG 2012) and 
"1" if separation of chairman and CEO exists (complied with MCCG 2012). 
(d) Audit committee competency 
At least one member must fulfil the financial expertise requirement under the 
Paragraph 15.09 of Listing Requirements where the audit committee must be of no 
fewer than 3 members and at least a member must be with the Malaysian Institute of 
Accountants (MIA) (Bursa Malaysia Berhad, 2013) . Audit committee competency is 
measured and coded as "O" if there is no member of audit committee that registered 
with MIA (not complied with MCCG 2012) and "I " if there is member of audit 
committee that registered with MIA (complied with MCCG 2012). 
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(e) External auditor non-audit service 
The Audit Committee should establish policies that govern the non-audit services 
contract and procedures to avoid impairment of the independence of external auditor. 
For the purpose of this study, external auditor of non-audit service is measured and 
coded as "O" if there is non-audit service provided (not complied with MCCG 2012) 
and "I" if non-audit service is not provided (complied with MCCG 2012). 
(f) Sourcing internal audit function 
An internal audit function should provide assurance that the internal controls are 
operating effectively according to the standards set by professional bodies. Internal 
auditors of a company should also conduct reviews regularly to determine the 
effectiveness of the governance and internal controls processes as well as understand 
the risk management. Current economic pressures and increased resources has given 
the company choices or alternative of whether to hire more competent personnel (in­ 
house) or consider outsourcing. These have caused concern on the independence of 
internal auditors. Therefore for the purpose of this study internal audit function is 
measured and coded as "O" for outsourced and "I" is for in-house. 
3.3.3 Measurement of Control Variables 
Control variables are used to control factors that affecting tax compliance but are 
independent from the corporate governance variables. Control variable balance the 
effect across subjects and groups to avoid potential problem in relation to variables 
bias (Laois & Richardson, 2011). For the purpose of this study, company size, 
performance and leverage level are chosen as control variables as there are changes in 
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tax policy that may affect the tax non-compliance. The measurement used in each 
control variables are as follows: 
(a) Company size 
Study by Ettredge, Johnstone, Stone, & Wang (2010) found that company size is 
important factor for better governance. Larger company are better performer in terms 
of diversifying risk (Abdul Wahab, 2010). Rice (1992) found a positive relationship 
between company size and tax non-compliance. For the purpose of this study, 
company size are measured based on total asset based on studies by Watts & 
Zimmerman (1986), and Zemzem & Ftouhi (2013 ). 
(b) Company performance 
Performance level in this study is measured based on Return on Asset Ratio (ROA) 
based on the study Mohd Mokhtar & Yusoff (2009). ROA is measured as pre-tax 
income divided by total assets. It shows the ability of a company to utilise their assets 
and measure the efficiency of the company in generating profits which also affect tax 
planning strategies (Hossan & Habib, 20 I 0). The higher the ROA, the better utilisation 
of company's assets. 
(c) Company leverage level 
Leverage is a significant factor in terms of managerial actions as it affect firm 
performance and reduce the cost (Abdul Wahab, 2010). In addition, Lisowsky (2010) 
study shows that performance is positively associated with tax aggressiveness. 
Leverage level of a company is measured based on the ratio of total debt over total 
shareholders' equity (Zainal Abidin, Mustaffa Kamal, & Jusoff, 2009). 
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3.3.4 Summary of Variables Measurement 
The variables measurement are summarised and listed out at Table 3-1 below: 
Table 3-1 






Penalties under section 1 12  of the !TA 
1967 - 0 
No penalties under section 1 1 2  of the 
!TA 1967 - I 
Reporting compliance Penalties under section 1 1 3  and 1 1 4  of 
the !TA 1967 - 0 
No penalties under section 1 1 3  and 1 1 4  
of the !TA 1967 - I 
Payment compliance 
Independent Board composition 
Service tenure 
Separation of 
Chairman and CEO 
Audit Committee 
(AC) 
External Auditor (EA) 
- Non audit service 
Fine under section 103, 107C(9) or 
107C(IO) of the !TA 1967 - 0 
No fine under section I 03, I 07C(9) or 
107C(IO) of the !TA 1967 - 1 
Less than 34% INED 
34%-67% INED 
More than 67% !NED 
> 9 years without justification- 0 
:S 9 years - I 
Duality- 0 
Separation - I 
Non MIA member - 0 
MIA member - I 
Perform non audit service - 0 









Outsource - 0 
In-house - I 
Total asset 
Return on Asset Ratio 
Ratio of total debt over total 
shareholders' equity 
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3.4 Data collection procedures 
This study uses secondary data which is the actual tax audit data for year of assessment 
2013 and 2014 which includes desk audit, external audit and collection. This data 
represent the audited and resolved public listed companies' cases in Malaysia in 
general. In order to get the data, an application in writing to the Director General of 
IRBM (DGIR) has to be submitted through Operational Tax Department of IRBM. 
Upon receiving the approval from DGIR, the Operational Tax Department then 
provides corporate tax audited cases that was finalized in 2013 and 2014. Preliminary 
screening were done manually to extract the public listed company data from other 
corporate tax cases. 
Based on the tax data, this study then collects data from public listed companies' 
annual report for year 2013 and 2014. These data were then evaluated on the extent 
of their compliance based on the recommendations of MCCG 2012 as public listed 
companies in Malaysia are required to comply with MCCG 2012 requirements which 
fall under the listing requirement regulated by Bursa Malaysia. These data will be 
used as corporate governance attributes to understand the effect of corporate 
governance on corporate tax compliance based on the assumption that companies will 
not significantly change throughout the years. The financial information data such as 
company size, performance and leverage are also taken from the annual reports. 
3.5 Research population and sampling technique 
With the aim to examine the relationship between corporate governance and tax 
compliance in Malaysia, this study focused on public listed company due to the fact 
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that public listed company's corporate governance are governed through Jaw, code and 
regulatory requirements set by the regulator, CS and statutory bodies. 
The target population in this study are public listed companies that were listed in the 
main market of Bursa Malaysia for year 2013 and 2014 as MCCG was revised in year 
2012. These public listed companies was selected because the Board had continuously 
monitor companies that were listed in Bursa Malaysia in order for them to meet its 
listing requirements. 
The sample was extracted from the list of public listed companies that were audited 
for year of assessment 2013 and 2014. The sample may be charged with either 
penalties under section 1 12  of the IT A 1967 for not submitting the required return 
forms to IRBM in the prescribed period (filing non-compliance), penalties under 
section 1 1 3  of the IT A 1967 for submitting incorrect return of income or incorrect 
information on chargeability (reporting non-compliance) or were fined under section 
103 for failure to pay taxes assessed and 107C of the IT A 1967 for failure to remit 
instalment on time (payment non-compliance). The sample selected that has been 
charged with penalties as mentioned above should be a general representative of tax 
non-compliant companies in Malaysia. 
The IRBM tax personnel has extracted 677 public listed company tax audit cases 
consist of two years data which is 420 cases in year of assessment 2013 and 257 cases 
in year of assessment 2014. Next stage were to exclude (1) companies that are not in 
the main market of Bursa Malaysia (2) companies with different regulatory such as 
financial sector and (3) companies that have changed the accounting period in 2013 
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and 2014. Using the industrial code, the sample is then categorized into subgroup. As 
a result 1 1 1  samples were selected which comprise of 64 cases in 2013 and 49 cases 
in 2014 as explained in Table 3-2 below: 
Table 3-2 
Sample Size/or Year 2013 and 2014 
Sectors16 Year2013 Year 2014 Total Percentage 
Sample 
Construction 2 3 5 4.50 
Consumer 10 10 20 18.02 
Industrial products 19 8 27 24.32 
Plantation 3 7 10 9.01 
Properties 8 6 14 12.61 
Technology 3 0 3 2.70 
Trading/Services 18 14 32 28.83 
Total 63 48 111 100.00 
3.6 Techniques of data analysis 
Statistical Package for the Social Science (SPSS) is being used to analyse data 
collected in this study. The following analysis are conducted in this paper: 
3.6.1 Descriptive analysis 
Descriptive statistics will be used to analyses the characteristic of corporate 
governance attributes, control variables and tax compliance measures to present the 
data like frequency, mean, median, mode, range, percentage, ratio, standard deviation, 
minimum, maximum and coefficient of variation. 
16 Category of sectors are in accordance with the classification of public listed companies from Bursa 
Malaysia (Appendix I). 
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3.6.2 Logistic Regression Analysis 
Logistic regression is used when there was only two groups of dependent variables 
(binary) (Pallant, 2010). Logistic regression provides investigation on the effect of 
multiple independent variables on dependent variables simultaneously. It predict the 
impact of several independent variables on dependent variables. It is also used when 
independent variables are correlated with each other. Logistic regression is more 
preferable as it does not require assumptions such as homoscedasticity and normality 
and is easier to interpret (Tabachnick & Fidell, 1996; Hair, Black, Babin, Anderson, 
& Tatham, 2006). 
The following logistic regression analysis was used to investigate the impact of 
corporate governance characteristic on three model of corporate tax compliance: 
FILCOMP = Filing compliance 
REPCOMP = Reporting compliance 
PMTCOMP = Payment compliance 
• FILCOMP 
Logit (1_TAXCOMP) = bo + b1BCOMP + b2DIRSERV + bJCHAIRCEO + 
b4AUDCOM + bsEXTAUD + bGIAF + b1CSIZE + bsCPERFORM + 
b9CLEVERAGE + e 
• REPCOMP 
Legit ( ) = bo + b1BCOMP + b2DIRSERV + bJCHAIRCEO + 1-TAXCOMP 
b4AUDCOM + bsEXTAUD + bGIAF + b1CSlZE + bsCPERFORM + 
b9CLEVERAGE+ e 
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Logit (1�;;;�::P) = bo + b1BCOMP + b2DIRSERV + bJCHAIRCEO + 
b4AUDCOM + bsEXTAUD + b61AF + b1CSlZE + bsCPERFORM + 
b9CLEVERAGE + bioDUMMYINDUSTRlES + c 
The independent variables are defined as follows: 
BCOMP = the percentage of external or !NED in board 
DIRSERV = a dummy number with a value of 'O' if the directors' service tenure o/9 
years and above, and a value of' 1 'otherwise 
CHAIR CEO = a dummy number with a value of 'O' if duality, and a value of 'I ' if 
otherwise 
A UDCOM = a dummy number with a value of 'O' if no Audit Committee rhar has 
member of an accounting body or association, and a value of 'J ' if otherwise 
EXIA UD = a dummy number with a value of 'O' if the External Auditor perform 
non-audit service, and a value of 'I' otherwise 
IAF = a dummy number with a value of 'O' if the company has Outsourced Internal 
Audit Function, and a value of 'I ' if otherwise 
CSIZE = the logarithm of total assets. 
CPERFORM = the logarithm of return on asset ratio 
CLEVERAGE = the logarithm of the company's ratio of total debt over total 
shareholders' equity 
3.7 Summary 
The board governance characteristic and control variables are mainly collected from 
company's annual report for the year 2013 and 2014 whereas the tax compliance data 
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are collected from the actual tax data in relation to the year of assessment 2013 and 




CHAPTER FOUR: DATA ANALYSIS AND EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
4.0 Introduction 
This chapter presents the findings and results of the study which include data analysis 
and data interpretation. In order to accomplish the research objective, the study carried 
out two types of analysis, namely descriptive analysis and inferential analysis. In the 
first part of this chapter discusses the type of public listed companies using descriptive 
analysis which shows the frequencies of distribution. Then it deliberates on results 
and explanation on the inferential analysis concentrating on logistic regressions. This 
analysis is used to investigate the relationship between the independent and dependent 
variables in order to validate the hypotheses. The data collected in this study have 
been processed and analysed using SPSS software. 
4.1 Descriptive analysis 
Descriptive analysis was performed to describe the characteristic of corporate 
governance, tax compliance, company size, company performance and company 
leverage by analysing the data such as percentage, frequency, mean, median, mode, 
range, ratio, standard deviation, minimum and maximum. 
4.1.1 The profile of public listed company 
Table 3-2 provide the breakdown of public listed company selected for the purpose of 
this study based on industry sectors in the main market of Bursa Malaysia. The table 
shows that the highest sector is trading and service (28.83%) followed by industrial 
products (24.32%). 
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Table 4-1 describe the profile of public listed companies in terms of company size, 
company performance and company's leverage. The result indicate that more than 62 
percent of the total sample has total asset value between RMIOO million to RMl,000 
million. As for company performance, majority of the public listed companies have 
recorded Return on Assets (ROA) ratio between O to 20 percent which formed 63 
percent of the total sample. Lastly, is the total debt over total shareholders' equity 
ratio which were used to measure the level of company's leverage. The statistic shows 
that majority of public listed companies (88 percent) have less than 1.35 debt over 
equity ratio. 
Table 4-1 
Percentage of Sample for Year 2013 and 2014 
Variables Items No of companies Percentage 
2013 2014 Total (%) 
Company size <l 00 million 18 9 27 24 
(total asset) 100 - 1,000 million 38 30 68 61 
> 1,000 million 7 9 16 14 
Total 63 48 111 100 
Company <0% 16 9 25 23 
performance 0-20% 41 28 68 61 
(Return on Asset >20% 6 1 1  17 16 
Ratio) Total 63 48 111 100 
Company leverage <1.35 55 43 98 88 
(ratio of total debt 1.35-2.70 7 4 l l IO 
over total 2.70-4.05 1 1 2 2 
shareholders' equity) >4.05 0 0 0 0 
Total 63 48 I l l  100 
Table 4-2 provide further analysis on the company size where the average total assets 
of public listed company is RMl,702.82 million whereas the biggest public listed 
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company is RM90,936.40 million. The mean of company's performance (return on 
asset ratio) 8.3 percent indicates the efficiency of management utilizing its asset base. 
Meanwhile the average of company's leverage (debt to equity ratio) is 0.52 indicating 
that most of public listed companies has taken on relatively little debt and thus have 
low risk and greater stability. 
Table 4-2 
Descriptive Statistic - Control Variables Year 2013 And 2014 
Variables Minimum Maximum Mean Standard N 
Deviation 
CSIZE 39.16 90,936.40 1,702.82 8,936.66 1 1 1  
CPERFORM -0.80 1.53 0.0830 0.22872 1 1 1  
CLEVERAGE 0.00 3.08 0.5191 0.67200 1 1 1  
CSIZE represent company size is measured based on total asset. CPERFORM 
represent performance level is measured based on Return on Asset Ratio. 
CLEVERAGE represent leverage level of a company is measured based on the ratio 
of total debt over total shareholders' equity. 
4.1.2 Corporate governance characteristic 
Table 4-3 provides descriptive statistics for independent variables to understand the 
corporate governance characteristic of the public listed company in this study. 75 
percent of the public listed company has range of 34 percent to 67 percent of !NED. 
This shows that most public listed company in Malaysia comply with the requirement 
of SC to have independent directors of at least two directors or one third of its board. 
Meanwhile, 66 percent of the public listed company engaged independent director that 
have been in service for more than nine years which is not in accordance with the SC 
requirement. On the other hand 84 percent of the public listed company applied 
separation of chairman of the board of director and the CEO following the SC 
requirement. Furthermore most of the audit committee of public listed company has 
MIA membership (95 percent) and all public listed company have an internal audit 
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function internally or outsource and 80 percent of the external auditor of the public 
listed company provides non-audit service. 
Table 4-3 
Percentage of Independent Variables for Year 2013 And 2014 
Variables Items No. of Companies 
2013 2014 Total % 
Board Less than 34% INED 16 5 21 19 
composition 34%-67% INED 43 40 83 75 
(BCOMP) More than 67% INED 4 3 7 6 
Total 63 48 111 100 
Serviee tenure :'o 9 years 24 14 38 34 
(DIRSERV) > 9 years 39 34 73 66 
Total 63 48 111 100 
Separation of Separation 51  42 93 84 
Chairman Duality 12 6 18 16 
and CEO Total 63 48 111 100 
(CHAIR CEO) 
Audit MIA member 58 48 106 95 
Committee Non MIA member 5 0 5 5 
Competency Total 63 48 111 100 
{AUDCOM} 
Non audit Not perform non audit service 16 6 22 20 
service by Perform non audit service 47 42 89 80 
external Total 63 48 111 100 
auditor 
(EXT AUD) 
Internal Audit In-house 33 25 58 52 
Function Outsource 30 23 53 48 
(IAF) Total 63 48 111 100 
BCOMP represent board composition is refers to the percentage of INED to the total 
number of directors in the board. DIRSERV represent independent director service 
tenure. CHAIRCEO represent separation of chairman and CEO. AUDCOM represent 
audit committee competency. EXTAUD represent non-audit service by external 
auditor is measured. IAF represent sourcing internal audit function whether 
outsourced or in-house. 
Table 4-4 represent further analysis on descriptive statistics as detailed out in the table, 
the mean, maximum and standard deviation for board composition ( continuous 
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variables!"). The board composition mean value is 0.4746 which shows that on 
average 47.46 percent of the director in public listed companies are INED. 
Table 4-4 
Descriptive Statistic for Board Composition 
Variables Minimum Maximum Mean Standard N 
Deviation 
IV 
BCOMP 0.25 0.83 0.4746 0.12318 1 1 1  
4.1.3 Tax compliance 
Table 4-5 presents descriptive statistic for dependent variables to present the type of 
tax compliance based on industry. From the overall view, the percentage of tax 
compliance among public listed company are higher than non-compliance. Reporting 
compliance is reported at 82 percent, followed by 53.2 percent for both filing and 
payment compliance. It also shows that the highest tax non-compliance activities 
involving public listed companies on the main market of Bursa Malaysia is the filing 
and payment which covers 46.8 percent of the samples for each variable. This is 
followed by reporting non-compliance at 18 percent. 
4.2 Logistic regression analysis 
Logistic regression is used when the dependent variables are categorical (Pallant, 
2010). It can be used to assess the contribution of each individual variable and test the 
predictive power of each variable. Three models involved in this study namely filing 
compliance, reporting compliance and payment compliance. 
17 Statistic such as mean, mean, median, mode, range, ratio, standard deviation. minimum and 
maximum are not appropriate for categorical variables {Pallant, 20 I 0). 
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4.2.1 Filing compliance 
Direct logistic regression was used to determine the impact of corporate governance 
characteristic on filing compliance of public listed company. The model have six 
independent variables (board composition, independent director service tenure, 
separation of chairman and CEO, audit committee competency, non-audit service by 
external auditor and sourcing internal audit function) and three control variables 
(company size, company performance and company leverage level). This study 
assumes that good corporate governance will leads to filing compliance. Preliminary 
assumption testing was conducted to check for multicollinearity with no serious 
violation noted (Refer Appendix 6). 
Using the logistic regression, the model was tested for goodness-of-fit. The model was 
explained as a whole between 14.5 percent (Cox and Snell R square) and 19.4 percent 
(Nagelkerke R squares) of the variance in tax compliance status. The chi-square value 
for the Hosmer-Lemeshow Test is 9.6159 with significance level of .329 which is 
larger than 0.05. This indicate support for the model which was able to distinguish 
between public listed company that is compliant and non-compliant. Details of the 
overall model's goodness-of-fit are shown in Table 4-6. 
Table 4-6 
Overall Model's Goodness-of-Fit Test (N=l l 1) - Filing Compliance 
Test R2 X2 df p 
Hosmer and Lemeshow Test 
Cox & Snell R Square 
Nagelkerke R Square 
Note: *Significance level is at p>0.05 
74 
. 145  
.194 
9.159 8 .329* 
The assessment would also explain on the model ability to predict the correct category 
for each variable. Table 4-7 shows the prediction for compliant public listed company 
was more accurate than for non-compliant public listed company. Using the model, 
64.6 percent of the sample were correctly classified. 
Table 4-7 




Overall percentage correct 















According to the results presented in Table 4-8, only one of the independent variables 
made a unique contribution that is statistically significant to the model (DISERV) at 
p=.001. The Wald test19 indicates that the highest value is for DIRSERV (10.517). The 
B values indicate that DIRSERV has a negative relationship with filing compliance. 
Specifically public listed company that has independent director who has been in 
service for more than 9 years are more likely to be filing compliance. 
The DIRSERV record the odds ratio20 of .213 which indicates that the longer service 
tenure of independent director service tenure of more than nine years, the less likely 
the company involved in tax non-compliance. As there are small number of outcome, 
19 Wald statistic is a parametric statistical that test the significance of particular explanatory variables 
with a known probability distribution (a chi-square distribution). It is used to determine b coefficient 
that is significantly different from zero in a logistic regression model (Field, 2009). "O" coefficient 
indicate that it has no impact on the dependent variable (Hair, Black, Babin, Anderson, & Tatham, 2006) 
20 Odds ratio represents the change in one of the categories of outcome when the value of a predictor 
increases by one unit (Tabbachnick and Fidell (2007)). 
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this association should be interpreted with caution. Therefore in order to generate a 
more precise estimate of effect, a larger study is needed. Detailed results on the logistic 
regression are shown in Table 4-8. 
Table 4-8 
Logistic Regression Predicting the Impact of Corporate Governance on Filing 
Com /iance 
95% CJ.for Odds 
Odds Ratio 
B S.E. Wald df Sig. Ratio Lower ul!l!er 
BCOMP -.574 1.737 .109 1 .741 .564 .019 16.977 
DIRSERV -1.548 .477 10.517 1 .001 .213 .083 .542 
CHAIRCEO .283 .568 .248 I .619 1.327 .436 4.041 
AUDCOM .998 1.200 .691 I .406 2.713 .258 28.509 
EXT AUD .504 .550 .839 .360 1.656 .563 4.871 
IAFlNOUT -.078 .437 .032 1 .858 .925 .392 2.179 
CSIZE .000 .000 .220 1 .639 1.000 1.000 1.000 
CPERFORM -.646 .950 .463 1 .496 .524 .082 3.371 
CLEVERAGE .258 .323 .638 I .425 1.295 .687 2.440 
Constant -.723 1.584 .208 .648 .485 
Note: "Significance level is at p<0.05 
4.2.2 Reporting compliance 
Direct logistic regression was used to determine the impact of corporate governance 
characteristic on the reporting tax compliance of public listed companies. The model 
have six independent variables (board composition, independent director service 
tenure, separation of chairman and CEO, audit committee competency, non-audit 
service by external auditor and sourcing internal audit function) and three control 
variables ( company size, company performance and company leverage level). This 
study assumes that good corporate governance will leads to reporting compliance. 
Preliminary assumption testing was conducted to check for multicollinearity with no 
serious violation noted (Refer Appendix 6). 
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Using the logistic regression, the model was tested for goodness-of-fit. The model was 
explained as a whole between 8.7 percent (Cox and Snell R square) and 14.2 percent 
(Nagelkerke R squares) of the variance in tax compliance status. The chi-square value 
for the Hosmer-Lemeshow Test is 8.957 with significance level of .784. This value is 
larger than 0.05 therefore indicating support for the model which was able to 
distinguish between public listed company that is non-compliant and compliant. The 
overall model's goodness-of-fit and model summary tables are shown in Table 4-9. 
Table 4-9 
Overall Model's Goodness-of-Fit Test (N= 111) - Reporting Compliance 
Test R2 X2 df p 
Hosmer and Lemeshow Test 
Cox & Snell R Square 
Nagelkerke R Square 
.087 
.142 
4.748 8 .784* 
Note: *Significance level is at p>0.05 
The assessment would also explain on the model ability to predict the correct category 
for each variable. Table 4-10 shows the prediction for compliant public listed company 
was more accurate than for non-compliant public listed company. Using the model, 
82 percent of the sample were correctly classified. 
Table 4-10 















Overall percentage correct 82.0 
Note: The cut-off value is 0.500. 
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Detailed results on the logistic regression for reporting compliance are shown in Table 
4-1 1 .  None of the independent variables made significant contribution. 
Table 4 - 1 1  
Logistic Regression Predicting the Impact of Corporate Governance on Reporting 
Com liance 
95% CJ.for 
Odds Odds Ratio 
B S.E. Wald df Si�. Ratio Lower ul!l!er 
BCOMP -2.294 2.276 1 .0 15  I  .314 .  l  01 .001 8.739 
DIRSERV -.252 .583 . 1 8 7  .666 .778 .248 2.436 
CHAIR CEO .560 .730 .588 .443 1 .751  .418 7.324 
AUDCOM 19.210 16024.711 .000 .999 220231 .000 
160.04 
EXT AUD .316 .646 .239 .625 1 .371 .387 4.862 
IAFINOUT .344 .572 .361 .548 1 . 4 10  .460 4.325 
CSJZE .000 .000 .918 .338 1.000 1.000 1.000 
CPERFORM -2.395 1 .516 2.495 . 1 14  .091 .005 1.780 
CLEVERAGE -.024 .415 .003 I .954 .976 .433 2.202 
Constant -19.825 16024.711 .000 .999 .000 
4.2.3 Payment compliance 
Direct logistic regression was used to determine the impact of corporate governance 
characteristic on the payment tax compliance of public listed companies. The model 
contained six independent variables (board composition, independent director service 
tenure, separation of chairman and CEO, audit committee competency, non-audit 
service by external auditor and sourcing internal audit function) and three control 
variables (company size, company performance and company leverage level). This 
study assumes that good corporate governance will leads to payment compliance. 
Preliminary assumption testing was conducted to check for multicollinearity with no 
serious violation noted (Refer Appendix 6). 
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Using the logistic regression, the model was tested for goodness-of-fit. The model was 
explained as a whole between 10.5 percent (Cox and Snell R square) and 14 percent 
(Nagelkerke R squares) of the variance in tax compliance status. The chi-square value 
for the Hosmer-Lemeshow Test is 4.370 with significance level of .822. This value is 
larger than 0.05 therefore indicating support for the model which was able to 
distinguish between public listed company that is compliant and non-compliant. 
Details of the overall model's goodness-of-fit and model summary tables are shown in 
Table 4-12. 
Table 4-12 
Overall Model's Goodness-of Fit Test {N= 111) - Payment Compliance 
Test R2 X2 df p 
Hosmer and Lemeshow Test 
Cox & Snell R Square 
Nagelkerke R Square 
Note: *Significance level is at p>0.05 
.105 
.140 
4.370 8 .822* 
The assessment would also explain on the model ability to predict the correct category 
for each variable. Table 4-13 shows the prediction for non-compliant public listed 
company was more accurate than for compliant public listed company. Using the 
model, 62.8 percent of the sample were correctly classified. 
Table 4-13 
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According to the results presented in Table 4-14, only one of the independent variables 
made a unique contribution that is statistically significant to the model (DISERV). The 
Wald test indicates that the highest value is for DIRSERV (6.132). The B values 
indicate that DIRSERV has a positive relationship with filing compliance. Specifically 
the shorter service tenure of independent director, the more likely the public listed 
company will be payment compliance. 
The DIRSERV recording an odds ratio of3.0l 4 which indicates that the shorter period 
of an independent director service tenure, the more likely public listed company is 
payment non-compliant, controlling for other factors in the model. Detailed results on 
the logistic regression are shown in Table 4-16. 
Table 4-14 
Logistic Regression Predicting the Impact Of Corporate Governance on Payment 
Com liance 
95% C.1.for Odds 
Odds Ratio 
B S.E. Wald df Sig. Ratio Lower U1212er 
BCOMP 1.207 1.682 .515 1  .473 3.343 .124 90.423 
DIRSERV 1 . 103  .446 6. 132 1 .013 3.014 1.259 7.217 
CHAIR CEO -.363 .559 .421 1 .516 .696 .232 2.082 
AUDCOM -1 .361 1 . 162 1 .371 1 .242 .257 .026 2.501 
EXT AUD -.398 .547 .529 1 .467 .672 .230 1.962 
IAFINOUT -.036 .428 .007 .933 .965 .417 2.232 
CSIZE .000 .000 .260 .610 1.000 1.000 1.000 
CPERFORM 1.434 1.030 1.939 .164 4.195 .558 31.564 
CLEVERAGE .014 .312 .002 1 .964 1 .014 .550 1.868 
Constant .522 1 .53 1  . 1 1 6  1  .733 1 .685 
Note: *Significance level is at p<0.05 
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4.3 Summary 
From the examination of link between corporate governance characteristic and tax 
non-compliance in Malaysia, it is found there is a negative relation between director 
service tenure and filing compliance but a positive relation with payment compliance. 
Table 4-15 
Summary of Logistic Regression Analysis Interpretation 
Dependent Independent Relationship Significant Result on 
Variable Variable Direction Value Hypothesis 
FILCOMP BCOMP Positive .741 Negative 
DIRSERV 
Positive/ .001 * 
Negative 
Negative 
CHAIR CEO Positive .619 Positive 




Positive/ .858 Negative 
IAFINOUT 
Negative 
*Significant level is at p<0.05 
Dependent Independent Relationship Significant Result on 
Variable Variable Direction Value Hypothesis 





CHAIR CEO Positive .443 Positive 









Dependent Independent Relationship Significant Result on 
Variable Variable Direction Value Hypothesis 





CHAIR CEO Positive .516 Negative 
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Table 4-5 (Continued) 
Dependent Independent Relationship Significant Result on 
Variable Variable Direction Value Hypothesis 









*Significant level ia at p<0.05 
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CHAPTER FIVE: DISCUSSION, CONCLUSION AND 
RECOMMENDATION 
5.0 Introduction 
This final chapter discuss the major findings from the statistical analysis conducted in 
Chapter Four in measuring the extent of relationship between corporate governance 
characteristic with tax compliance. Subsequently implications and limitation of the 
study and recommendations for future research will be discussed further. 
5.1 Discussion on findings 
The primary aim of this paper is to provide additional value to the current literature by 
examining the importance of corporate governance aspects with tax compliance. This 
study attempts to expand the literature by analysing the tax compliance data from 
IRBM database and information from the annual report using the SPSS statistical tools. 
Corporate governance characteristic and tax compliance data was collected from 2013 
to 2014 which consist of 1 1 1  public listed company from the main market of Bursa 
Malaysia. 
This study then construct data set that covers the profile of taxpayer, tax compliance 
data of each category and corporate governance characteristic for every public listed 
companies involved. Logistic regression were used to investigate the relationship 
between corporate governance characteristic and tax compliance in Malaysia. Three 
models of tax compliance were involved namely filing compliance, reporting 
compliance and payment compliance. 
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5.1.1 Descriptive analysis 
The analysis illustrates in Table 3-2 shows that the highest audited sector of public 
listed companies were from trading and service sector with 32 companies (28.8 
percent). The plausible explanation was that this sector dominates the proportion of 
public listed companies in Malaysia. It was reported that services sector contributed 
about 55 percent of the Malaysia's gross domestic product (GDP) (55.2 percent in 
2013 and 55.3 percent in 2014). The strong growth of service sector was supported by 
strong domestic consumption and investment activities (Ministry of Finance, 
Malaysia, 2014). 
The data from annual report in Table 4-3 shows that most of public listed companies 
followed the principle under MCCG 2012 namely two directors or one third of the 
board as independent directors, applied separation of chairman of the board of director 
and the CEO, audit committee that has MIA membership, internal audit function 
whether in-house or outsourced. In contrast, it is also discovered that most public listed 
companies have independent directors that had been in service for more than nine years 
and the external auditor of the public listed company that provides non-audit service 
which are not in accordance with the SC requirement under MCCG 2012. 
Tax compliance data in Table 4-5 demonstrate that most of public listed companies 
had complied with income tax reporting requirement which stands at 82 percent. 
Conversely, both filing and payment compliance data shows that only 53.2 percent of 
the public listed companies were tax compliant. 
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5.1.2 Logistic regression 
A summary of findings is presented in this study by referring to the research question 
as Chapter One. Six hypotheses were developed to investigate the relationship between 
corporate governance and tax compliance in Malaysia using three different tax 
compliance model namely filing compliance, reporting compliance and payment 
compliance. 
(a) The relationship between corporate governance characteristic and filing 
compliance 
The analysis showed that the highest industry involved in filing non-compliance were 
from industrial products sector (32. 7 percent). The complexity of tax and control 
system of industrial product was perceived as the rationale for filing non-compliance 
among this sector. Industrial sector enjoy various tax incentives such as pioneer status, 
reinvestment allowance, income tax allowance and double deduction. Due to the 
complexity of the tax system and lack of knowledge on the current tax law, public 
listed company have to appoint tax professional to complete their tax return. However, 
relying on inefficient tax professionals will probably lead to filing non-compliance 
especially during the peak season of filing dateline. 
From the logistic regression analysis, it is found that only one corporate governance 
characteristic has significant result which is the independent director service tenure 
(DIRESRV). The B values indicate that DIRSERV has a negative relationship with 
filing compliance indicating that independent director who have been in service for 
more than 9 years are more likely to be filing compliance. This finding implied that 
longer tenure directors have greater expertise, experience, high commitment and 
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reputation. If an independent director has longer tenure, the board is more effective in 
preventing tax non-compliance. Their experience allows other directors gain better 
understanding of the company and its people to develop better governance and 
subsequently preventing earnings management and tax non-compliance. From 
another viewpoint, this also indicate that independent director who have been in 
service less than 9 years tend to be filing non-compliance due to lack of experience 
and expertise in dealing with tax administration. 
The other reason may be due to the fact that no benefit can be gained by public listed 
company for not complying with the filing of tax return. This finding is in line with 
the study by Peasnell, Pope & Young (2004) on the relationship between service tenure 
of independent director and earnings management where it is not anticipated a big 
corporate taxpayers would intentionally fail to submit their tax return due to their 
immense presence in Malaysia. However, due to the fact that there are small number 
of sample, this association should be interpreted with caution. To generate more 
precise estimate of effect a larger study is needed. 
Excluding the above corporate governance characteristic, the logistic regression 
results clarifies that the independent and control variables shows largely insignificant 
correlation with filing compliance of public listed companies. This suggests that filing 
compliance is not necessarily influenced by corporate governance characteristic (board 
composition, separation of chairman and CEO, audit committee competency, non­ 
audit service by external auditor and sourcing internal audit function) as well as 
company size, company performance and leverage level. 
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(b) The relationship between corporate governance characteristic and 
reporting compliance 
The analysis showed that the highest industry involved in reporting non-compliance 
were from properties and trading/service sector (28.6 percent in each sector). This may 
be due to the fact that these sectors enjoy fewer incentives as opposed to other sector 
which contributed to inequity and non-neutrality in current corporate tax system where 
these sectors are paying more taxes compared to other country. Consequently higher 
reporting non-compliance were reported where these sector seek method to lower the 
amount of tax liability through tax planning, tax avoidance or tax evasion. 
The logistic regression results clarifies that independent and control variables shows 
largely insignificant correlation with reporting compliance of public listed companies. 
This suggests that reporting compliance is not necessarily influenced by corporate 
governance characteristic (board composition, independent director service tenure, 
separation of chairman and CEO, audit committee competency, non-audit service by 
external auditor and sourcing internal audit function) as well as company size, 
company performance and leverage level. Public listed company would not 
intentionally under reporting their income due to their immense presence in Malaysia 
as a big corporate taxpayers. Furthermore the strict tax audit and investigation done 
by IRBM could be the contribution for insignificance of reporting compliance. 
Even though all of the variables were insignificant, it is noted that most of the result 
shows positive relationship between corporate governance characteristic and reporting 
compliance. This is consistent with the previous studies where public listed companies 
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that have higher corporate governance quality will subsequently reduce the risk of tax 
non-compliance. 
( c) The relationship between corporate governance characteristic and 
payment compliance 
The analysis showed that the highest industry involved in payment compliance is 
trading/service sector (33 percent). One of the reason is that this sector dominates the 
proportion of public listed companies in Malaysia. Another potential reason is that this 
sector believes that they could avoid paying taxes without being caught by the 
authorities which has been proved by the high statistic of reporting non-compliance. 
After being penalised with back dated taxes, they would probably face problem 
financially to settle the taxes owed. This would lead to higher payment non­ 
compliance in trading/service sector. 
From the logistic regression analysis, this study sees one significant result which is the 
service tenure of independent director (DIRSERV). The B values indicate that 
DIRSERV has a positive relationship with payment compliance. This indicated that 
independent director who have been in service for less than 9 years are more likely to 
be payment compliance. The result shows that payment tax compliance is higher if the 
service tenure of independent director is less than 9 years. More importantly this 
finding also supports one of the main objectives of MCCG 2012 to increase the board 
independence and study by Wiersema and Bantel (1992) where long tenure can impair 
independence of the director. Another reason may be due to that not much benefit can 
be gained for payment non-compliance as the income has already been reported and 
any unpaid amount would be subject to penalty just in a matter of time through legal 
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action. However, due to the fact that there are small number of sample, this association 
should be interpreted with caution. To generate more precise estimate, a larger and 
extensive study is needed. 
Other than the above corporate governance characteristic, the logistic regression 
results clarifies that independent control variables shows largely insignificant 
correlation with payment compliance of public listed companies. This suggests that 
payment compliance is not necessarily influenced by corporate governance 
characteristic (board composition, separation of chairman and CEO, audit committee 
competency, non-audit service by external auditor and sourcing internal audit 
function) as well as company size, company performance and leverage level. 
(d) Summary 
The logistic regression analysis has tested the impact of corporate governance 
characteristic as recommended by MCCG 2012. This study has found an empirical 
evidence to affirm that there are significant differences on the level of corporate tax 
compliance among Malaysian public listed companies depending on the type of tax 
compliance i.e filing, reporting or payment compliance. 
The regression analysis results provide significant and negative relationship between 
independent director service tenure and filing compliance. In detail, this finding 
implied that the longer service tenure of independent directors, the greater expertise, 
experience, and reputation which permits other directors to gain better knowledge and 
understanding of the company or industry and would indirectly avoid non-compliance 
behaviour. This finding also suggest that independent director who has been in service 
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less than 9 years tend to be filing non-compliance due to their lack of experience and 
expertise in dealing with tax administration or due to the complexity of tax issues as 
the highest industry involved is industrial product that enjoy various tax incentives. 
Conversely the same regression analysis provide significant and positive relationship 
between independent director service tenure and payment compliance. The reason may 
be due to not much benefit can be gained for payment non-compliance as the income 
has already been reported and any unpaid amount would be subject to penalty due to 
close monitoring of tax authorities. This study also provide insignificant relationship 
between corporate governance characteristic and reporting compliance. From the 
results and analysis above it is found that corporate governance characteristic has 
significant impact on tax compliance depending on the type of compliance i.e filing, 
reporting or payment. 
5.2 Theoretical and practical contribution 
This study may benefit and contribute to both theoretically and practically in the 
following areas: 
5.2.1 Theoretical contribution 
This study presents a multitude areas of tax compliance that should be considered by 
corporate governance expertise and academician i.e filing, reporting and payment 
compliance. Having an understanding on the specific type of tax compliance issues 
either filing, reporting or payment can be useful and recommends greater awareness 
on the importance of tax issues. This study also provide the preliminary findings on 
the impact of independent director service tenure to the level of tax compliance of a 
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public listed company. Hopefully the finding will provide more current picture on the 
type of corporate governance characteristic that affect the tax compliance of a 
company and will be able to fill the gap between these two fields. When two 
disciplines have a common goal, the combination of corporate governance 
characteristic and tax will be more effective. 
5.2.2 Practical contribution 
The empirical findings from this study provide positive input to the relevant 
regulators and authorities to further strengthen the best practice of corporate 
governance characteristic. Regulators should also educate the companies to 
continuously maintain and promote good governance practices. The efforts by 
regulators to strengthen the Code by the MCCG 2012 was not directly to increase 
the level of corporate tax compliance but this study has provides some empirical 
evidence where the corporate tax compliance does have a significant relationship 
with corporate governance characteristic. 
In order to broaden the tax revenue collection and reforms to the tax system, it is also 
suggested that tax authority to look at the other areas that needs improvement. Current 
practice of!RBM is to detect tax non-compliance based on the analysis of company's 
financial statements. Understanding the relationship between corporate governance 
especially on the board of directors' characteristic and tax non-compliance from the 
field of corporate governance will help to provide an answer and reinforces the results 
of other studies that claim the tax authority is able to use the corporate governance 
characteristic as an indicator to detect tax non-compliance. This study is able to 
contribute by showing that the same characteristic of corporate governance will have 
91 
·- 
different impact on different type of tax compliance. Therefore the IRBM will be able 
to understand what motivates a company to deter certain type of tax compliance. 
5.3 Limitation of the study 
The main limitation of this study is the small number of samples of 1 1 1  public listed 
companies in year 2013 and 2014. However, there were studies that used small number 
of samples such as Ho & Williams (2003) study comprises about 84 to 108 companies 
for each of the countries, and Judge, Erez, Bono & Thoresen (2003) study comprises 
of 1 1 1  firms, The small sample size may be insufficient to result in statistical 
significance for the main hypothesis. The choice of 1 1 1  companies in this study is 
more manageable due to the fact the variables are numerous and items that need to be 
collected. 
Another limitations of this study is the observed year which consist of only two year 
of studies. The two-year study would not provide an insight on the trends of tax non­ 
compliance activities among public listed companies. However it does provide an 
indicator on how certain corporate governance characteristics influence the tax non­ 
compliance. 
5.4 Direction for future research 
This study highlights the potential areas and direction for future research. Firstly, 
future studies could investigate more on the board of directors' attributes especially on 
service tenure of independent director. In order to manage the risk of having longer 
service tenure of independent director, it is also suggested that the companies to 
provide training on tax issue for directors involved. An increase level in education 
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may increase the tax awareness and demand for corporate tax accountability. The 
IRBM could work with the SC to ensure that directors must attend tax related training. 
This is in line with the requirement of Bursa Malaysia where companies are now 
mandated to disclose training/course/seminar attended by directors (Bursa Malaysia 
Berhad, 2013). 
This study would also suggest that companies to disclose the outcomes of their recent 
tax position i.e tax audits, tax payments in their prospectus to enable the companies to 
be listed in Bursa Malaysia for the purpose of transparency and protection of the 
investors. After being listed, the companies must also publish the tax audits outcome 
on the web site of Bursa Malaysia. This regulation has been successful implemented 
in Greece where public companies are required to publish tax audit results 
(Kourdoumpalou & Karagiogos, 2012). This method would most likely reduce the 
incentive of managers to engage in aggressive tax planning strategies as the market 
would receive a signal on the possibility of misleading of profits from the stakeholder. 
To further enhance the generalizability of the findings it would be more meaningful to 
extend the sample to all the companies listed on Bursa Malaysia. Another potential 
area is the comparative analysis on the relationship between corporate governance and 
tax non-compliance between Malaysia and other countries with similar settings. 
5.5 Conclusion 
From the observation of 1 1 1  public listed companies, this study found that majority of 
the public listed companies had followed the recommendations proposed by MCCG 
2012. Whether these good practice would reduce the risk of tax non-compliance 
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cannot be concluded in this study. However, this study is able to see a pattern in terms 
of relationship between corporate governance characteristic and tax non-compliance 
using the actual tax non-compliance data from IRBM. It is found that service tenure 
of independent director do have significant relationship with tax non-compliance 
depending on the type of tax compliance involved i.e filing, reporting or payment. 
As a caveat, these findings does not generalise to overall population such as small 
medium company, non-profit organisation, cooperation and the likes. However if the 
tax non-compliance is evident at public listed companies level with such regulations 
on governance, then it is suspected that such practice would exhibit worse problem in 
other population as well. Therefore, further study on the effect of other corporate 
governance characteristic on tax compliance would give us better understanding of this 
subject. It is hoped that the finding of this study would provide benefits in terms of 
safeguarding the shareholder interest of public listed companies and improving the 
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APPENDIX 1: CLASSIFICATION OF PUBLIC LISTED COMPANIES IN 














Companies manufacture materials or components 
into new products for consumer use 
Companies engage in constructing any form of 
structure including roads and railroads 
Close-ended investment entities 
Open-ended investment entities 
Companies that provide services in activities of 
obtaining and redistributing funds, in the form of 
deposits by Central Banks and other monetary 
institutions, insurance and other activities 
auxiliary to financial intermediation 
Companies that provide hospitality services in 
the form of accommodation, meals and drinks 
Companies manufacture materials or components 
into new products for industrial use 
Infrastructure project companies 
Companies engage in exploration extraction, 
dressing and beneficiating of minerals 
Companies engage in the cultivation, planting 
and/or replanting of crops. The processing of 
agricultural products in factories on farms and 
plantations is also included if it is not feasible to 
report separately this activity from production of 
crops 
Companies invest directly or indirectly in real 
estate through management or ownership 
Real Estate Investment Trusts Real estate investment trusts or corporation 
(RE!Ts) 
Special Purpose Acquisition Special purpose acquisition companies 
Company 
Trading/Services Companies engage in distribution of products and 
provision of services other than financial 
services, e.g banking and insurance 
Technologies 
Source : Bursa Malaysia 




APPENDIX 2: DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS 
FILCOMP 
Cumulative 
Frequency Percent Val id Percent Percent 
Valid Filing compliance 59 53.2 53.2 53.2 
Filing non-compliance 52 46.8 46.8 I 00.0 
Total 1 1  I  100.0 100.0 
REPCOMP 
Cumulative 
Fre9uenc� Percent Valid Percent Percent 
Valid Reporting compliance 91 82.0 82.0 82.0 
Reporting non-compliance 20 18.0 18.0 I 00.0 
Total 1 1 1  100.0 100.0 
PMTCOMP 
Cumulative 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent 
Valid Payment compliance 59 53.2 53.2 53.2 
Payment non-compliance 52 46.8 46.8 I 00.0 
Total 1 1 1  100.0 100.0 
SECTOR 
Cumulative 
Fre9uenc� Percent Valid Percent Percent 
Valid CONSTRUCTTON 5 4.5 4.5 4.5 
CONSUMER 20 18.0 18.0 22.5 
IND-PRODUCT 27 24.3 24.3 46.8 
PLANTATION 10 9.0 9.0 55.9 
PROPERTTES 14 12.6 12 .6 68.5 
TECHNOLOGY 3 2.7 2.7 71 .2 
TRADING/SERVICE 32 28.8 28.8 100.0 
Total 1 1  I  100.0 100.0 
106 
DIRSERV 
Fre9uency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid > 9 years 38 34.2 34.2 34.2 
< 9 years 73 65.8 65.8 100.0 
Total 1 1 1  100.0 100.0 
CHAIR CEO 
Fre9uency Percent Val id Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid Duality 93 83.8 83.8 83.8 
Separation 18  16.2 16.2 100.0 
Total 1 1 1  100.0 100.0 
AUDCOM 




Fre9uency Percent Valid Percent Percent 
106 95.5 95.5 95.5 
5 4.5 4.5 100.0 
1 1 1  100.0 100.0 
Valid Perform non audit service 





y Percent Val id Percent Percent 
22 19.8 19 .8  19.8 
89 80.2 80.2 100.0 























N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
CSIZE I I I 39160000.00 90936400000. I 702820992.3 8936659976.7 
00 333 70 18  
CPERFORM 1 1 1  -.80 1.53 .0830 .22872 
CLEVERAGE 1 1 1  .00 3.08 . 5 19 1  .67200 
Valid N (listwise) 1 1 1  
Statistics 
BCOMP 









APPENDIX 3: LOGISTIC REGRESSION (FILING COMPLIANCE MODEL) 
Logistic Regression 
Case Processing Summary 
Unweighted Cases' 






I I 1 
0 
I 1 I 
0 







a. If weight is in effect, see classification table for the total number 
of cases. 














Fre ( 1 )  
Outsourced 53 1.000 
In-house 58 .000 
Duality 93 1.000 
Separation 1 8  .000 
Non MIA member 106 1.000 
MIA member 5 .000 
Perform non audit service 22 1.000 
Not perform non audit 89 .000 
service 
> 9 years 38 1.000 
< 9  ears 73 .000 
109 





Step O FILCOMP Filing non-compliance 
Filing compliance 
Filing non- Filing Percentage 
compliance compliance Correct 
59 0 100.0 
52 0 .0 
53.2 Overall Percentage 
a. Constant is included in the model. 
b. The cut value is .500 
Variables in the Equation 











Variables not in the Eq nation' 
Score df Si 
Step O Variables BCOMP .124 .725 
DIRSERV(l) 12.449 .000 
CHAIRCEO(l) .050 .823 
AUDCOM(l) 1 . 5 1 6  .218 
EXTAUD(l) 1.652 . 199 
IAFINOUT(l) 1 . 160 .281 
CSIZE .543 .461 
CPERFORM .080 .778 
CLEVERAGE 1.349 .246 
a. Residual Chi-Squares are not computed because of redundancies. 
Block 1: Method= Enter 
Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients 
Chi-square df Sig. 
Step I Step 17.386 9 .043 
Block 17.386 9 .043 
Model 17.386 9 .043 
1 10  
-2 Log 
Model Summary 







a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 4 because 
parameter estimates changed by less than .00 I .  
Hosmer and Lemeshow Test 
Step Chi-square 





Contingencr Table for Hosmer and Lemeshow Test 
FILCOMP = Filing 
FILCOMP = Filing n-comeliance comeliance 
Observed Exeected Observed Exeected Total 
Step I 10 9.175 1.825 1 1  
2  9  8.617 2 2.383 1 1  
3  5  8 . 128 6 2.872 1 1  
4  9  6.747 2 4.253 1 1  
5  7  5.519 4 5.481 1 1  
6  4  5.022 7 5.978 1 I 
7 4 4.720 7 6.280 1 1  
8  4  4.343 7 6.657 1 1  
9  3  3.727 8 7.273 1 1  






FILCOMP Filing non-compliance 
Filing comeliance 
Filing non- Filing Percentage 
compliance compliance Correct 
39 20 66.1 
1 1  41 78.8 
72.1 Overall Percentage 
a. The cut value is .500 
1 1 1  
Variables in the Eguation 
95% C.I.for 
EXP(B) 
B S.E. Wald df Si�. Exe(B) Lower Ueper 
Step BCOMP -.574 1.737 . 109 .741 .564 .019 16.977 
I' DIRSERV(l) -1 .548 .477 I 0 .517 .001 .213 .083 .542 
CHAIRCEO(I) .283 .568 .248 .619 1.327 .436 4.041 
AUDCOM(l) .998 1.200 .691 .406 2.713 .258 28.509 
EXTAUD(I) .504 .550 .839 .360 1 .656 .563 4.871 
lAFINOUT(I) -.078 .437 .032 .858 .925 .392 2.179 
CSIZE .000 .000 .220 .639 1.000 1.000 1.000 
CPERFORM -.646 .950 .463 .496 .524 .082 3.371 
CLEVERAGE .258 .323 .638 .425 1.295 .687 2.440 
Constant -.723 1.584 .208 .648 .485 
a. Variable(s) entered on step I :  BCOMP, DlRSERV, CHA!RCEO, AUDCOM, EXT AUD, 
IAFINOUT, CSJZE, CPERFORM, CLEVERAGE. 
1 1 2  
APPENDIX 4: LOGISTIC REGRESSION (REPORTING COMPLIANCE MODEL) 
Logistic Regression 
Case Processing Summary 
Unweighted Cases' 






1 1 1  
0  
1 1 1  
0  







a. If weight is in effect, see classification table for the total number 
of cases. 
Dependent Variable Encoding 




Categorical Variables Codings 
Parameter 
coding 
Fre ( 1 )  
IAFINOUT Outsourced 53 1.000 
In-house 58 .000 
CHAIRCEO Duality 93 1.000 
Separation 1 8  .000 
AUDCOM Non MIA member 106 1.000 
MIA member 5 .000 
EXT AUD Perform non audit service 22 1.000 
Not perform non audit 89 .000 
service 
DIRSERV > 9 years 38 1.000 
< 9 years 73 .000 
1 13  





















a. Constant is included in the model. 
b. The cut value is .500 
Variables in the Equation 
Step O Constant 
B 





df Sig. Exp(B) 
.000 .220 
Variables not in the Eguation' 
Score df Si 
Step O Variables BCOMP .773 .379 
DIRSERV(l) .006 .936 
CHAIRCEO(l) .027 .871 
AUDCOM(l) 1 . 1 5 1  .283 
EXTAUD(I) .412 .521 
IA FIN OUT( I) 1.468 .226 
CSIZE .573 .449 
CPERFORM 2.679 .102 
CLEYERAGE .004 .952 
a. Residual Chi-Squares are not computed because of redundancies. 
1 1 4  
Block 1: Method= Enter 
Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients 























a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 20 because 
maximum iterations has been reached. Final solution cannot 
be found. 







Contingenci Table for Hosmer and Lemeshow Test 
REPCOMP = Reporting REPCOMP = Reporting 
non-comeliance compliance 
Observed Expected Observed Expected Total 
Step I 1 1  10.956 0 .044 I 1 
2 1 1  10.254 0 .746 1 1  
3  9  9.809 2 l.191 1 1  
4  9  9.591 2 1.409 1 1  
5  9  9.255 2 1.745 1 1  
6  8  8.850 3 2 . 150 I I  
7  10 8.560 2.440 1 1  
8  9  8.291 2 2.709 1 1  
9  9  7.990 2 3 .0 10  I  I  
10  6  7.443 6 4.557 12 





Reporting non- Reporting Percentage 
compliance compliance Correct 







a. The cut value is .500 
82.0 
Variables in the Eguation 
95% CJ.for 
EXP(B) 
B S.E. Wald df Sii:l. Exp(B) Lower Upper 
Step BCOMP -2.294 2.276 1 .0 15  .314 . 101  .001 8.739 
I' DJRSERY(I) -.252 .583 . 187 .666 .778 .248 2.436 
CHAIRCEO(I) .560 .730 .588 .443 1 .751  .418 7.324 
AUDCOM(l) 19.210 16024.7 .000 .999 220231160.04 .000 
I 1 6 
EXTAUD(I) .3 16  .646 .239 .625 1 .371  .387 4.862 
IAFINOUT(I) .344 .572 .361 .548 1 . 4 10  .460 4.325 
CSIZE .000 .000 .918 .338 1.000 1.000 1.000 
CPERFORM -2.395 1 .5 16  2.495 . 1 1 4  .091 .005 1 .780 
CLEVERAGE -.024 .415 .003 .954 .976 .433 2.202 
Constant -19.825 16024.7 .000 .999 .000 
1 1  
a. Yariable(s) entered on step I :  BCOMP, DIRSERV, CHAIRCEO, AUDCOM, EXT AUD, 
IAFINOUT, CSIZE, CPERFORM, CLEVERAGE. 
1 1 6  
. - 
Casewise List" 
Observed Temeorar;t Variable 
Case Selected Status' REPCOMP Predicted Predicted Graue Res id ZResid 
2 s l** . 162  0  .838 2.278 
4 s I** .143 0 .857 2.451 
35 s I**  . 143 0 .857 2.443 
38 s I** . 1 1 7  0  .883 2.751 
42 s I** . 125 0 .875 2.643 
93 s I** .097 0 .903 3.047 
a. S = Selected, U = Unselected cases, and ** = Misclassified cases. 
b. Cases with studentized residuals greater than 2.000 are listed . 
1 1 7  
APPENDIX 5: LOGISTIC REGRESSION (PAYMENT COMPLIANCE MODEL) 
Logistic Regression 
Case Processing Summary 
Unweighted Cases' 






1 1 1  
0  
1 1 1  
0  








a. If weight is in effect, see classification table for the total number 
of cases . 






Categorical Variables Codings 
Parameter 
coding 
( ! )  
IAFINOUT Outsourced 53 1.000 
In-house 58 .000 
CHAIR CEO Duality 93 1.000 
Separation 18  .000 
AUDCOM Non MIA member 106 1.000 
MIA member 5 .000 
EXT AUD Perform non audit service 22 1.000 
Not perform non audit 89 .000 
service 
DI RS ERV > 9 years 38 1.000 
< 9  ears 73 .000 
1 1 8  





















a. Constant is included in the model. 
b. The cut value is .500 
Variables in the Equation 
53.2 







df Sig. Exp(B) 
.507 .881 
Variables not in the Equation' 
Score df Si . 
-  
Step O Variables BCOMP .394 .530 
D!RSERV(I) 6.174 .013 
CHAIRCEO(I) .086 .770 
AUDCOM(l) 2 . 3 1 1  .128 
EXTAUD(I) 1 . 2 1 1  .271 
IAFINOUT(I) . 199 .656 
CSIZE .271 .603 
CPERFORM 1.235 .266 
CLEVERAGE .277 .599 
a. Residual Chi-Squares are not computed because of redundancies. 
1 1 9  
Block 1: Method = Enter 
Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients 
Chi-square df Sill- 
Step I Step 12.275 9 . 198 
Block 12.275 9 . 1 98  
Model 12.275 9 . 1 98  
Model Summary 







a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 4 because 
parameter estimates changed by less than .00 I .  







Contingenc;r Table for Hosmer and Lemeshow Test 
PMTCOMP = Payment non- PMTCOMP = Payment 
comeliance comeliance 
Observed Expected Observed Expected Total 
Step I 8 8.323 3 2.677 I I  
2  6  7.627 5 3.373 1 1  
3  9  7.309 2 3.691 I I  
4  6  7.057 5 3.943 I I  
5  7  6.501 4 4.499 1 1  
6  6  5.975 5 5.025 I I  
7  5  5.150 6 5.850 1 1  
8  6  4.320 5 6.680 I I  
9  4  3 . 8 1 3  7  7 . 1 87  I I  





Payment non- Payment Percentage 
Observed comeliance comeliance Correct 
Step I PMTCOMP Payment compliance 44 15  74.6 
Payment non-compliance 26 26 50.0 
Overall Percentage 63.1  
a. The cut value is .500 
Variables in the Eguation 
95% CJ.for 
EXP(B) 
B S.E. Wald df Si�. Exe(B) Lower Ueeer 
Step 1' BCOMP 1.207 1.682 . 5 15  .473 3.343 .124 90.423 
DIRSERV(I) I .  I  03 .446 6 . 132 .0 13  3 .014 1.259 7 .217 
CHAIRCEO(I) -.363 .559 .421 . 5 16  .696 .232 2.082 
AUDCOM(I) -1 .361 1 . 162 1 .371 .242 .257 .026 2.501 
EXTAUD(I) -.398 .547 .529 .467 .672 .230 1.962 
IAFINOUT(I) -.036 .428 .007 .933 .965 .417 2.232 
CSIZE .000 .000 .260 .6 10  1.000 1.000 1.000 
CPERFORM 1.434 1.030 1.939 .164 4. 195 .558 31 .564 
CLEVERAGE .014 .312 .002 .964 1 .0 14  .550 1.868 
Constant .522 1 . 53 1  . 1 1 6  .733 1.685 
a. Variable(s) entered on step I :  BCOMP, DIRSERV, CHAIRCEO, AUDCOM, EXTAUD, 











APPENDIX 6: MULTICOLLINEARITY ANALYSIS 
Collineari!:):'. Statistics 
Model Tolerance VIF 
(Constant) 
BCOMP .965 1.037 
DIRSERV .903 1 . 108  
CHAIRCEO .943 1.060 
AUDCOM .977 1.023 
EXT AUD .904 I .  I  06 
IAFINOUT .877 1 . 1 40  
CSIZE .915 1.093 
CPERFORM .846 1 . 1 82  
CLEVERAG .901 I .  I I  O  
E  
a. Dependent Variable: FILCOMP 
Collinearity Statistics 
Model Tolerance VIF 
(Constant) 
BCOMP .965 1.037 
DIRSERV .903 1.108 
CHAIRCEO .943 1.060 
AUDCOM .977 1.023 
EXT AUD .904 1.106 
IAFINOUT .877 1 . 140 
CSIZE .915 1.093 
CPERFORM .846 1 . 1 82  
CLEVERAG .901 1 . 1 1 0  
E  
a. Dependent Variable: REPCOMP 
122 
Collineari� Statistics 
Model Tolerance V!F 
(Constant) 
BCOMP .965 1.037 
DIRSERV .903 I. I 08 
CHAIRCEO .943 1.060 
AUDCOM .977 1.023 
EXT AUD .904 1 . 106 
!AFINOUT .877 1 . 140  
CSIZE .915 1.093 
CPERFORM .846 1 . 1 8 2  
CLEVERAG .901 1 . 1 1 0  
E  
a. Dependent Variable: PMTCOMP 
123 
